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The Week

IS the deadlock between Britain and Ireland really broken? At this moment it is impossible to know but it is not impossible to hope. The principle upon which de Valera is seeking to make peace is a principle to which Lloyd George has in some degree deferred, simply by treating with Sinn Feiners and by arranging a truce with them. It is the principle of Irish nationality. What de Valera and his colleagues require is the full liberation of their nationality under a political constitution which guarantees its liberation and which conforms faithfully and serviceably to Irish national needs, including Ulster's. No peace that fails to offer these terms to Ireland can end the deadlock, and it would be definitely better for Sinn Fein to resume its harrowing warfare than to submit to any compromise of its long-asserted and well-founded principle of national recognition. Whether Irishmen can agree that the status of the dominions is a national status—that is a question. The dominions themselves do not seem to be satisfied that theirs is a national status. They ask for, and are in process of receiving, greater control of their destinies. But if such a status is offered by Britain, without strings, the Sinn Fein Irish will be driven hard to make out their case against Britain as the oppressor of Irish nationality.

BRITAIN has acted in bad faith toward Ireland so often, however, that it is well to pierce through the pro-British interpretations of the Associated Press to the heart of whatever genuine Irish news we receive, and to weigh carefully the actual statements of the principals involved. It is practically certain that de Valera wants peace, but not at the price of resumed political and social degradation. The Colonial premiers apparently grasp this idea but it is not clear that Lloyd George will be able to force his own Tory oligarchy to yield to the liberation of Ireland. The bigotry of Belfast, for example, has always responded to the Tory oligarchy; and the bigotry of Belfast rages worse than the savagery of Tulsa. On this side of the water, to correspond with it, we have the denunciation of de Valera by Judge Cohalan. Judge Cohalan is the mouthpiece of American imperialism. He wants a war between Britain and America, and he is willing to see it fought in Ireland. He accuses de Valera of planning to ally Ireland with Britain and thus to betray America in advance. We can only say of Judge Cohalan that he is on the same political level as a professional Orangeman, than which nothing lower is conceivable.

THE danger of war with Mexico lies not so much in the actual differences between that republic and ourselves as in the opportunity which their existence gives to the natural born trouble maker in his private or official capacity—the man who rocks the boat. Everyone who wishes for peace between the United States and Mexico felt a thrill of alarm when Secretary Denby ordered two war vessels to Tampico because "labor troubles might be expected." As it is not usual for a nation to settle the labor troubles of its neighbors with a club the appearance of these vessels at Tampico looked like provocation of the crudest type. There

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was relief when it was learned that Mexican officials were disposed to minimize this occurrence; and intense satisfaction when by Secretary Hughes's intervention the vessels were withdrawn. The whole affair will strengthen the faith of those who believe that Secretary Hughes is sincere in his determination to preserve peaceful relations with Mexico. It should serve as a warning to him of the danger to which those relations are subjected even by those of his own household, and of the extent to which that danger is increased by the delay of recognition and the uncertainty of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

THE independence promised to the Philippines is the sort of thing a great republic in the throes of the tariff and prohibition may easily neglect. But this forgetfulness will have its price, as Mr. Manuel Quezon, president of the Philippine Senate, reminds us, in words of singular candor and sanity. The Islands, he says, will wait ten or twelve years, but, if we indefinitely postpone the fulfillment of our promise, "it would cause a revolution." He declares plainly that the Filipinos "are a peaceful people and easily led, and we will take our medicine from you now, but you must not push us too far." And with a frankness seldom found in national leaders he admits that Americans are needed in the government for efficiency's sake, and that the Filipinos have "made a mess" of their financing. The closer the attention paid by Congress to the remarks of Mr. Quezon, the better for our relations with the Philippines.

OUR dye industry, which would not be in existence but for our confiscation of German property and patents, is a healthy one for an infant. In 1920 we produced 40 per cent more than in 1919, or 88,000,000 pounds of dye stuffs, to the average value of $1.08 a pound. German dye imports for the year amounted to about two per cent of this total. And the Fordney Tariff will impose on German dyes an embargo for three years. The result of this protection can be guessed from the increase in the price of dyes since the war. "Direct black," for instance, sells at from three to four times as much as the pre-war product of twice the strength; indigo has gone up 300 per cent; acid black, at half the strength of the pre-war dye at 26 cents a pound, now sells at from $1 to $1.50. Who is going to be protected? Last of all, at this rate, those who buy the clothes. Mr. Frear of Wisconsin tells us there is a giant dye monopoly, while Mr. Garvan, formerly the Custodian of Alien Property, calls him a liar, says he is a tool for the German cartel, and advances as good reason for the preemption of German dye patents the charge that the Germans did not use these patents for legitimate purposes, but solely in order to enslave our industries and leave us helpless in war.

EVER since the American Legion was founded, we have heard of instances of its members taking the law into their own hands to defeat the purposes of people whose opinions they disliked, but only after Mr. Warner's thorough indictment in the Nation, followed by the challenge of the American Civil Liberties Union do we realize how close a second to the Italian Fascisti is the Legion's record of violence and intolerance. The Civil Liberties Union has published a list of fifty cases, in different states, in which members of the American Legion tarred and feathered radicals, or raided and wrecked their halls, or suppressed their newspapers, or ran them out of town, or blocked their meetings, or prevented such unquestionably innocent performances as the German film, Dr. Caligari, or the recitals of Fritz Kreisler. Only a few times after the rough and ready attempt by legionaries to play understudy for the law have their leaders made a decent protest. As a rule they have "officially" disavowed the rough stuff, and taken no steps to prevent its recurrence. Unless the Legion honestly rebukes its own mob violence, we must continue to believe, as now we do, that it does not disapprove of it.

WHILE one might have desired such a thing, it would perhaps have been too much to expect the winners of the war to agree to the prosecution of whatever war criminals there were in their own ranks as well as to the prosecution of German offenders. But once the burden of prosecution was placed solely on Germany it would also have been too much to expect the trials to be more than the half-hearted affairs at which the French have so indignantly protested. That there is something in their protest besides an outraged sense of justice we gather from these words of M. Poincaré:

> . . . . we cannot accept for a moment longer the judicial farce of Leipzig. To withdraw is good; to open prosecutions in France in absentia is better. But even that is not enough. Germany is obliged by the treaty to hand over the guilty. She must hand them over. If not, she once more repudiates her engagements. We will then have authority not only to continue the occupation of Düsseldorf, Ruhrort and Duisburg, but also we will be within our rights because of Germany's permanent revolt against the treaty in refusing to fix the date from which the years of occupation are to be counted.

If Germany's default leads to such an occupation, France will not altogether regret that the criminals were not handed over.

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WITH the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres the Allies uncorked an imp which they now heartily wish they could coax back into the bottle. For Greece, greatly to the Allies' embarrassment, is on the point of reviving her war against Turkey for the "enforcement" of the Treaty. Her finances are desperate, yet she boasts of 300,000 troops in Asia Minor held ready to clean up the Turks, who, while lacking transport and ammunition, have the double advantage of holding the inner lines and of feeling that they are fighting for their country and their lives. Since the only important action so far is the Greek occupation of Ismid—some sixty miles from Constantinople—followed immediately by its abandonment, the way lies fairly open to Constantinople, and there stirs faintly in the hearts of Russian royalist refugees a hope, based on the rumor that Brusilov leads an army in Asia Minor, that the City of the Tsar may at last fall to Russia. In which event, they say, they will "take their hats off" to Trotsky. Meanwhile, the circumstances of the evacuation of Ismid by the Greeks, who indulged in a good deal of robbery and massacre there, show the futility of the whole business. For 33,000 Greeks, fearing Turkish retaliation after the massacre, fled from Ismid. Where lies the strength of the Greek case, if the Greeks in the cities which they claim by virtue of their colonization have to depart from them en masse for fear of revenge?

THE New York Times recently published the rumor that Lenin had caused Trotsky to be arrested. Be it said to the credit of the Times, that however much it might desire to believe the rumor, it reports the news as a rumor only. The Times has gradually learned to be more cautious than it was two or three years ago, when its columns were a source-book of Russian mythology. The picture of the relations of Lenin and Trotsky as drawn month by month by the Times has been at once puzzling and exciting. On March 12th, 1918, Trotsky had been dismissed by Lenin, a month after the latter had fled to Riga (February 19th). By June 29th of the same year they were sufficiently reconciled to have fled together to the Murmansk coast. Yet on August 12th they were preparing their escape to Berlin. The next day, by a quick change of plan, they had taken refuge at Kronstadt. They lived in peace until January 9th, 1919, when Lenin was arrested because of a disagreement with Trotsky (a week later Lenin arrived at Barcelona). Again, on April 3rd, 1919, there was a "break" between them, but no arrests were made. Lenin was at liberty until September 26th, 1919, when he was overthrown and imprisoned in the Kremlin. On October 9th he was rearrested, and on October 14th he was held a prisoner by the Bolsheviki to prevent his escape. A year later he was tried for "abuse of power," but on the 2nd of last March he had fled from Moscow, where he is still. Not unnaturally this latest report finds us completely sceptical, and indeed it will be impossible to believe that either Lenin or Trotsky has arrested the other until we actually see their names on the blotter or their faces behind the bars.

The Disarmament Conference

THE United States is to take a place in the counsels of the Powers. But the United States will join in the association of Powers on its own terms. That is the obvious meaning of President Harding's initiative in proposing informally a conference on disarmament of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to meet in Washington. It is not necessary to withhold interest from the proposal on the ground that it has not been made formally nor formally accepted. The diplomacy of the present administration is quite too cautious to admit publicly an initiative of this kind without assuring itself of the practicability of its endeavors. The other Powers must have given informal assent to President Harding's proposals. And why should they not have done so? Spokesmen for the Allied governments have often given expression to their desire to draw the United States into the international concert. In only one point does President Harding's diplomacy appear to attain results that might not have been anticipated. That is in the suggestion of a discussion of Pacific problems by the nations directly interested, including China. If Japan has consented to this—and we seem justified in assuming that she has—some of the most difficult and dangerous of international problems have been perceptibly advanced toward a solution.

What progress is such a conference likely to make toward actual limitation of armaments? It is not an unduly pessimistic view that if the conference were aiming at immediate disarmament alone the auspices are not so favorable as those of a conference confining itself, as by the terms of the Borah resolution, to the discussion of naval limitation by America, England and Japan. Such a conference would have had a perfectly definite and intelligible object, and one which ought to be feasible if the nations are rationally governed. The three nations are today so balanced in naval

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power that no one of them could safely attack another without the aid of the third: and the diplomatic status, together with the whole underlying network of economic and social relations, makes it inconceivable that any two could combine to attack the third. If the United States greatly increases her navy, it follows inevitably that Japan and England will increase their navies, until the relative weights are about what they are now, unless, of course, bankruptcy supervenes to reconcile one nation or another to a condition of defencelessness. It follows that from a nationalistic as well as from a cosmopolitan point of view such a competition in armaments is sheer waste. There was fair ground for hoping that a conference of these three Powers alone might arrive at an intelligent agreement. But President Harding's invitation includes France and Italy as well, and embraces land as well as naval armament. Reduction of land forces, however, is regarded as impracticable by France, probably by Italy as well. And if any of the three naval Powers wishes to proceed to build up its armaments unhampered by international agreements, it has only to couple limitation of naval armaments with limitation of land armaments.

Thus by broadening the scope of the disarmament discussion President Harding has assumed the risk of its failure to reach positive results. And that we regard as a grave matter, especially at this time, when financial pressure would increase the chance of results. But we are ready to admit that there is another side to the question. Disarmament is desirable for the relief it would afford from financial burdens, but above all because it would reduce the danger of war. That danger, however, can never be eliminated so long as the underlying political relations of nations remain unsettled. Before the war, when England and Germany were pursuing conflicting ambitions in the Near East, there was much talk of a naval holiday. The two countries were admittedly building against each other, to the great disadvantage of both treasuries. But every movement for limitation made by either side was looked upon with suspicion by the other side. It is easy to agree not to build, and then build secretly. The British believed that the Germans would do just that, and the Germans had the same belief concerning the British. The United States today has interests, especially in the matter of China, that openly conflict with those of Japan. An agreement on armaments that left this fundamental conflict unadjusted, would not necessarily reduce the danger of war. Indeed, it might even increase the danger, if it gave rise to suspicions of bad faith.

President Harding, in coupling a discussion of the political problems of the Far East with the problem of disarmament in that quarter, has accepted the risk of a conference that leads nowhere, but it cannot be said that he is not playing for a stake that is worth risks. If the conference succeeds, the peace of the Pacific will rest on a much firmer basis than on a disarmament agreement alone. In the case of Europe no such combination of purposes is attempted. Yet the fact that France and Italy are to participate makes it fairly certain that the scope of the inquiry will broaden out to political affairs. It is idle to discuss disarmament with France without discussing the problem of Germany, or to discuss it with Italy without considering the facts of a Balkanized Europe. Nor can these be discussed without bringing out the relations of European reconstruction and international finance, and without indicating the opportunities and obligations of the United States in the restoration of Europe.

Among liberal commentators on the Peace of Versailles it is a favorite saying that the whole peace would have been much better if the conference had been held at Washington. Not only that: America would have understood much better what was going on, and would have been more likely to join in enforcing the peace. The conference on armaments may in some measure undo the mischief that was done at Versailles. It may have no other immediate result than an airing of opposing views. But it can not fail to lay a basis for a more sympathetic understanding between America and her late associates in the war, and thus smooth the way for full American participation in the international effort to establish a more pacific order in world affairs.

The Case for Amnesty

ONE generally expected result of the official termination of the war is the release of the prisoners under the Espionage and Draft acts. There are about two hundred of such prisoners, of whom one hundred and thirty-one are I. W. W.'s. Among the others are Socialists, of whom Eugene V. Debs and Joseph W. Caldwell are most prominent; Reverend William Madison Hicks, a religious objector; the Russians arrested for distributing the Soviet constitution in December, 1918, and Tom Welsh, convicted under the Trading with the Enemy act for bringing into the country a letter having to do with the Irish revolution. The small number and miscellaneous character of these prisoners, and the obscurity of most of them,

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makes it altogether possible that they may be overlooked and forgotten, and the advantages of a general act of clemency lost.

For there are such advantages. In the first place, the United States in contrast to the other nations at war already appears in a light unfavorable to the virtues of democracy. Italy by royal decree dated November 17, 1918, granted amnesty to persons convicted of offences similar to those penalized by the Espionage law, and by decree dated February 21, 1919, to more serious offenders. France granted a general amnesty October 24, 1919, and Belgium October 31st. Moreover, this reluctant attitude on the part of the United States is in striking contrast to our own precedents. After the War of 1812, when trading with the enemy was a commonplace and defeatism a national danger, after the Mexican War, and during the Civil War as well as at its close, there were grants of amnesty. The phraseology used in the decree of Presidents Lincoln and Johnson—"anxious to favor a return to the normal course of the administration," "to the end that . . . . peace, order, and freedom may be established"—show that they recognized something decidedly out of the natural course in the fact of political prisoners in the republic. At the present time the abnormality is of far more serious concern. Granting all that the most convinced defenders of the present order can allege against Socialists and I. W. W.'s, the possible harm or danger arising from the freeing of these prisoners is insignificant compared to the evil that is wrought by their continued incarceration. The disposition to regard political methods as futile, to conceive force as the only remedy for wrong, is growing among people of radical mind. To them the continued imprisonment of these men for offences touching the rights of free speech, press, or assembly, through which alone can peaceful reformation be achieved, is a proof of the impotence of political methods, a challenge, and an outrage. Amnesty is now as it has always been, on the part of government a pledge of confidence and goodwill.

All this applies particularly to the case of the I. W. W.'s, who constitute so large a proportion of the war prisoners. Of these the greater number were convicted in the famous blanket trial in Chicago, in which a hundred members of the organization were tried for conspiracy to violate the Espionage and Draft acts. Although the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and the attempt to carry it before the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari failed, the circumstances are such as to cast doubt on the validity of the trial. This doubt has been voiced by Captain Alexander Sidney Lanier, a lawyer who attended the trial and made a summary of its results as representative of the Military Intelligence Division, and who appealed to President Wilson in an open letter published in the New Republic for April 19, 1919. Captain Lanier holds that the indictment was "fatally defective in that it does not give to the defendants sufficient information of the nature and cause of the accusation against them"; that while the evidence shows that certain of the defendants might have been successfully prosecuted as individuals under the Espionage act, it is insufficient to establish the fact of a conspiracy as charged in the indictment; and that in the case of other defendants there is not one scintilla of evidence to show that they conspired to violate or in fact did violate any law, and that their inclusion in the verdict and sentence was "a gross miscarriage of justice."

There is another circumstance, quite extra-legal, which should have weight in the consideration of the appeal for clemency on behalf of prisoners under the war acts. It is regrettably true that during the war and the excitement which preceded and followed it, government, national and local, failed in its duty of affording protection to citizens in the exercise of constitutional rights. Such failure may have been inevitable, but it remains none the less a substantial cause of distrust and irritation. Particularly was this the case with the I. W. W.'s. They were everywhere the object of special persecution. Their meetings were broken up, headquarters were sacked, members were pursued even to death by mobs, with a concerted violence which suggests that the foreign war was made a pretext for the levying of industrial warfare. The most entensive outrage was the forcible deportation of over a thousand members or suspected members of the I. W. W. from Bisbee, Arizona. The perpetrators were never punished, and the sheriff who led the mob was actually given a commission by the government which he had betrayed. Amnesty can compensate only to a limited extent for what opponents of the war illegally suffered, but it can do much toward that reconciliation on which a return of "peace, order, and freedom" depends.

In addition to those held by the federal government there is an unascertained number of prisoners convicted by state authorities under circumstances which in some cases suggest a flagrant withdrawal of legal rights and safeguards in response to war hysteria. A general amnesty would serve as an example of clemency which might be followed largely by the states. In addition it would have the advantage of strengthening the precedents already established by our own and other countries;

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and in view of the large number of prisoners whose cases were affected by industrial warfare it would be an important sign of that patience, tolerance and magnanimity of which qualities we shall have abundant need in the difficult years which lie before us. It is understood that the Attorney General's office is willing, on the formal conclusion of peace, to consider the war cases individually. If this plan is followed it is to be hoped that its operation will be rapid and complete, and that for the sake of the larger value of the result it may amount to general amnesty.

The Antioch Plan

WHAT American colleges most need is a new definition of the aims of general education and a new method by which there may be secured to it the concentration, energy and enthusiasm, which attend vocational and professional studies. To give the general student the virtues of specialization, not its defects, is the problem of the college of today. At first sight it might seem that the university, where the general student is at least in physical contact with all the resources of special research, is the place where the problem is to be solved; but experience seems to prove that it is there that the chasm is widest. It is in the very shadow of specialization that the general student shows himself least responsible, least concerned with justifying his existence. And in the mass and momentum of a university there is difficulty in organizing the regular students, who tend more and more to become irregular, a kind of militia as opposed to the trained shock troops of the professional courses. For many reasons the small college is better fitted than the university to undertake experiments: its size, its flexibility, its environment, often give it decisive advantages. Educators have watched with close attention Amherst in New England and Carleton in Minnesota. Now Antioch comes into the picture.

The essence of the Antioch Plan is the coordination of technical and cultural education, "so that while the student is becoming fitted for work in a profession or other vocation, he or she at the same time will be preparing for effective citizenship." The aim is not to treat the general college course as a preliminary to specialization, but to penetrate that course with the very material and methods of specialization. "The Antioch program provides that the professional or technical student may spend half his time at school, and half in practical work, as nearly as possible along the line of his preferred calling. To this end students will alternate five weeks of school and five weeks at work." Arrangements have been made with neighboring factories to employ students on this half time basis, and it is planned to erect a factory building on the campus where a number of small industries can be housed. An obvious economy is effected when the effort which a student frequently is obliged to put forth for self-support is directed into the channels in which his educational activity is flowing. But this practical experience is to be infused with the spirit of the general educative process as a whole.

> The aim of all vocational courses at Antioch, whether professional, industrial or commercial, is to develop in the student capacity for initiative, self-reliance, sound judgment, and the ability to carry ultimate responsibility in his calling. Antioch will not offer highly specialized courses in any occupation. It will rather aim to develop and to coordinate general knowledge and practical capability in all phases of administration. . . . Antioch is to make generalists rather than specialists.

That this plan offers certain immediate advantages in increasing the morale of the student body is evident. For one thing, by making every student "work his way through college," it promises to limit attendance to those who wish to be educated, and eliminates the vast, inert mass of those who do not. For another, it may be premised that the boy or girl whose preference for intellectual work is clear, will find his desire strengthened by the contrast between it and manual toil. The return to study after five weeks of factory or office work will take place with real zest and renewed energy. But there is a larger social principle involved. The New Society sketched by Walter Rathenau depends upon what he calls the Interchange of Labor as one of its main principles. According to this conception every man or woman engaged in mechanical toil has the right to do a portion of his day's work in intellectual employment, and every brain worker must devote a portion of his time to physical labor. The proportion between physical and intellectual toil is to be determined by tests of the citizen's capacity. As an initiation Dr. Rathenau would have the entire youth of Germany devote a year of labor service to bodily training and work. By this plan he proposes to establish a genuine equality of opportunity and a fraternity of toil, a true democracy. It is obvious that the Antioch Plan, within the limits of a college community, follows the lines which Dr. Rathenau has laid down for the regeneration of society as a whole. The experiment has thus a large social bearing, and we may expect that in the light of this fact the members of the community will give themselves to it with enthusiasm.

The Antioch Plan recognizes the fact that we

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cannot look to specialists alone for the salvation of society. Such salvation must come from the diffusion and validity of the entire educational process, from the men and women of active intelligence, broad view, wide sympathy and resolute character who are fitted as a result to see life steadily and see it whole, reason soundly to firm conclusions in regard to it, and hold these conclusions in the face of death. And that this result cannot be attained in our industrial civilization by any process of withdrawal and seclusion in the culture of the past the Antioch Plan emphasizes as the text of its whole endeavor in the sentence: "The best cultural values are gained not when we escape from industry, but when we make it express our highest purpose."

Carpentier: A Symbol

IS it because big cities favor contagion that a vogue can now become established so readily? We know that when it was proposed to the New York aldermen to give the freedom of the city to Professor Einstein one honest gentleman asked, who is Einstein? But within twenty-four hours even he was saying, Oh, of course, you mean the man who discovered relativity. The word "relativity" might as well have been Skolinkentot so far as the alderman was concerned. Professor Einstein has since observed that he met one, or possibly two, persons in the United States who seemed to him to have understood his theory. But the tag was sufficient. Hundreds of newspaper articles and hundreds of thousands of people said Relativity thinking they meant something. They liked the word. And Einstein had at least enough vogue to be eligible for the freedom of the city of New York.

Poor Madame Curie tottering under her sixty-one honorary college degrees is another example of epidemic "recognition," but more characteristic of the suggestible American is his prompt aesthetic capitulation to the thing of the moment. One season, a good one, it may be Isadora Duncan, another, less good, Lord Dunsany. It may be Margot or it may be alligator pears. It may be fairies or Hindus or Russian tempera paintings or aviators. It may be a movie film, the young French poets, Thomas Hardy or Vernon Castle. It may be Wells's history, psycho-analysis or the ouija board. It may be chow dogs, Scotch terriers, police dogs. With great quickness and completeness a new name or new faith gets a circulation, and the circle of fame widens until it takes in most of the big cities in the western world.

The latest of these amusing fads was Carpentier. A prize-fighter who had also been in the show business, Carpentier made a splendid impression by the way he had risked his life during the war. He was one of some million Frenchmen who had done so, and he had fought in a country where even clergymen are conscripted, but there were enough embusqués to make people feel glad that here was a professional athlete who thought more of his country than of his own skin. Carpentier, besides, had great personal style. He came to the prize ring somewhat like Cashel Byron. He was distinctly not a bruiser but a man of polished manner and gay presence, and he had suppleness and charm where his predecessor, Gentleman Jim Corbett, had proved to be a little dry and wooden. With this ease of manner was combined a beauty about which Bernard Shaw in particular had become ecstatic. The leading anti-romanticist of our day saw in Georges Carpentier the impressive and awe-inspiring mien of Charles XII. Who was Charles XII? Well, he was undoubtedly impressive and awe-inspiring to those who had formed an erroneous picture of his appearance; and Carpentier rose up as remarkably aristocratic after he had stretched the vulgar Beckett at his feet.

Against this challenger for the world's championship, who was Dempsey? Dempsey was a familiar type, and, speaking for the sensitive American man, a detested one. All over this country on the corners of Main Street there may be found groups and gangs of young men, and often among them are big-limbed, glowering youths who do not make life any easier for the sensitive. These youths have a small verbal repertory but a large stock of scowls and blows. And in course of time these muckers, plug-uglies, rough-necks, may be counted upon to say or more likely do something to upset the equilibrium of the finer-grained. Even when these muscular youths graduate as teamsters, blacksmiths, switchmen, iron-workers, they clash frequently and sharply with the sedentary American of what Roosevelt called the mollycoddle type. They bore head-down into the midriff of a less sedentary type in the employing class. They win no particular favor among the show-going people. The rough-neck may be typical of millions of Americans and his roughness may be part of the pioneer virility that America still requires. It may even have been celebrated with profound sympathy by Walt Whitman in his democratic equalitarianism. But it makes no appeal to the protected educated urban population. They see in Carpentier a man of high spirit and high intelligence, "a man, damn it, whom you'd be glad to meet in a drawing-room." In Dempsey they see a mere bruiser. "Why, if he weren't a prize-fighter, he'd be a teamster." Think of that untouchable condition!

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Add to this the facts that William Harrison Dempsey was tried (though acquitted) as a draft-evader, was culpably heavier and bigger than Carpentier, and was so mercenary as to charge fifty cents to be seen training, while Carpentier admitted only newspaper men, privileged admirers and friends. Almost everything about Dempsey fed the partisanship of the Carpentier public. Among the people who paid $50, $40, $30, and $20 to see the fight there was an overwhelming sentiment, a passionate sentiment, for Carpentier. Many men stayed away because they could not bear to see Carpentier hammered, much less beaten. Over the result some men cried.

It may be said that this goes with sport, that it was a normal exhibition of favoritism and competitiveness, with sentiment naturally on the more attractive side. If this be so, the less interest in sport we have the better. If we cannot have a prize-fight without rampant class-feeling and sentimentality we should cut out prize-fights and leave them to the hard-headed gentry who understand such things.

You do not find Mr. George B. Underwood, boxing expert of the Evening Telegram in New York, making a matinée idol of Carpentier. His account of the preceding fight with Levinsky, plus the accounts by Joe Vila, Charles Mathison, Bob Edgren, Tad, James Duffy and James W. Gantz, make the word fiasco seem highly charitable. "The best that can be said about the match is that it was so bad that many of those who saw it will never be convinced it was on the level." So Mr. Duffy puts it. This is compatible with Carpentier's being a Greek god, but it does refresh our memories of the Greeks. Mr. Underwood's quotations and observations did not imply at all that the Carpentier-Dempsey fight would not be fair. "This time Georges Carpentier is 'right.' He will have to be." As a matter of fact scrupulous fair play characterized the Dempsey-Carpentier fight. Carpentier respected his opponent, each of them was decent, good-tempered and brave. Carpentier's gameness, proved in some terrible fights, was said to have astonished Dempsey, and as a seasoned prize-fighter who has been in the game since he was fourteen, Carpentier's unqualified acceptance of his defeat cannot be put down to mere chivalry. Had either he or his capable manager any grievance, it would have been vocalized. But it showed the generosity and clean temper of good sportsmanship and we have had nothing but the completest acknowledgement of a fair deal on both sides.

This seems to us the right spirit, and the manly spirit. The victory of Carpentier would have been resplendent. He was at a big disadvantage and only by supreme effort and audacity could have won. But does this mean that the people who vindictively hoped to see Dempsey beaten down and slugged to unconsciousness were sportsmanlike? On the contrary, they seem to us to be revealed either as frustrated mollycoddles or as tiresome snobs. They had no real interest in the merits of the struggle, no information or understanding. They took the fight as an orgy of sentimentality, and twisted Carpentier into a figure which the realities of this attractive prize-fighter do not support.

The absence of fair play in this instance—"fair play depends upon essentially respecting one's opponent just because of his loyalty to his own side," as Josiah Royce said—points to the real dangers of the contagion of opinion where a knowledge of facts does not accompany opinion. What we get as a result is not true loyalty but sentimentality that imports loyalty into a false situation.

Beauty and truth were not degraded when Dempsey hit Carpentier in the stomach, and afterward smacked him on the jaw. Brain did not go down before brawn, or gaiety before sullenness or the Greek god before a teamster. It wasn't as tragic or as symbolic as all that. But the fact that Carpentier was beaten is possibly not an unmixed evil. It drives the great army of unemployed sentimentalists in another direction than prize-fighting. It leaves prize-fighting to the people who can be objective about it and who established the odds of the late combat as, coldly, about 3 to 1. Among such people the undiscriminating lovers of truth and beauty have no place. They should look for the triumphs of truth and beauty in some sphere less arbitrary than one in which ten counts "out."

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Mastery of the Sea

NOT all the decisive struggles of mankind are fought on the battlefields or on the decks of man-of-wars.

From the days of the Phoenicians and Tyrians, mastery of the sea has been won and held by the nation which could furnish the greatest number of skilled and valorous seamen. No nation has ever developed sea power unless it furnished the seamen from its own population. No nation has long retained sea power after its men quit the sea. Ships alone have never won a battle and the fruits of naval victories are easily dissipated unless the victors are backed by a sufficiently numerous seafaring population in their home land. For, in the final analysis, sea power is in the seamen. Vessels are but the seamen's tools. And tools have always belonged to the races or nations who could use them most effectively.

To develop a large number of trained seamen, to foster and develop a tendency to the sea in the population, has ever been the care of statesmanship. Nations have fought over fishing grounds, not so much because of the fish to be caught, but because of the seamen to be trained in the use of those grounds. The increase in the trend to the sea has always been identical with periods of national expansion, be that expansion in trade or in other directions. Any steadily decreasing trend to the sea has been a symptom of national decay. This does not mean a decay in wealth. That might be increasing while the vitality of the people was ebbing away. When, for one reason or another, the men of a nation ceased to seek the sea, and the nation had to secure its seamen elsewhere, the decay in sea power began. If the trend from the sea was not checked and stopped, sea power passed away. A mere glimpse into the histories of the Hansa League, of Venice or of Genoa, of Spain or of Portugal, or of the Netherlands should convince anybody that sea power flows from the seamen.

The merchants of the Hansa League treated their seamen in such manner that the men and boys from either the united cities or their vincinity refused to serve. Desertions were punished by branding the deserter's face with a red-hot iron. Of course, desertions to some extent stopped; but so did the trend of the population to the sea. The keelhauling of the Dutch had as much to do, nay more to do, with the Dutch decay in sea power than the sea battles lost to England. Dangers and defeats never stopped the trend to the sea. It was harsh treatment, insufficient remuneration, and the feeling of a failure to be able to follow the upward course of society that checked the trend of any given people to the sea. Of course, all these things are comparative. The treatment and conditions accepted as tolerable in one period will be felt as the rankest kind of injustice in another. The standard changes.

Spain, once all powerful on the sea, could not man the battleships which fought under her flag at Trafalgar. (Mahan, Sea Power in History.) The Spanish Armada is often said to have been overcome by the elements and the proud Philip so declared; but Professor James Anthony Froude in his lectures, English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century, gives the true explanation. England was sending some of her best blood to sea, and her seamen so improved the rig and sailing qualities of their vessels that they "could work to windward with sails trimmed fore and aft." The foremast was changed into a jib boom; the aftermast into a spanker boom; fore and aft sails were put on them; the trusses were improved and the English vessels could fight under sail. "The English ships had the same superiority over the galleons as the steamships of today have over sailing vessels. They had twice the speed; they could lie two points nearer to the wind."

When the revolutionary wars opened, the fleet of France was, in vessels, men, and guns, about equal to the English, but England could re-man her vessels five or six times, while France could not do so once. France had to resort to landsmen, whom she trained in harbor until they could dismantle and re-rig the vessels with remarkable speed, but after a gale at sea the vessels were like wrecks. The English vessels might leave the harbor looking like wrecks, but after a couple of days at sea they were in the very best of trim and fitness.

So sea power passed from those peoples. Of course, there were many contributory reasons, but the most direct reason was the loss of seamen and the failure to develop seamen of their own.

America had its full share of the world's carrying trade. The decline set in in the early fifties. The Civil War made it convenient to place the vessels under foreign flags, and much tonnage was lost, but if other false steps had not been taken and the Americans had remained at sea, vessels would have been replaced and the former status restored.

The thirteenth amendment was adopted. Slav-

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ery was abolished on land, on the sea it was continued. The seaman fought for the freedom of others; he failed to obtain it for himself. To become a seaman was to surrender all rights of citizenship, and the freedom-loving American boy refused to enter sea life. Through the crimping system the seaman was deprived of the wages earned, as he was of his freedom. The American who went to sea was compelled to live in the forecastle with men whose language he could not understand; he was compelled to accept wages upon which a family could not be sustained; the competition with all the world's derelicts set his wages, and when at sea he was compelled to do the work that the derelicts could not do. The American quit the sea and the vessels were manned by men from all the nations and all the races.

When the Seamen's act was passed America had practically no seamen of her own. As far as can be ascertained it appears that native Americans, exclusive of officers, composed less than seven per cent of the crews on the merchant vessels under our flag at the end of 1913. As a result of the better conditions on shipboard and the increases in the respective rates of pay which followed the enactment of the Seamen's law, and partly due to the patriotic call made to young Americans during the war, the percentage of native-born sailing under our flag increased rapidly. Just prior to the general lock-out on May 1st of this year, it was in excess of fifty per cent. This takes no account of the very considerable number of naturalized Americans who earn their livelihood in the American merchant marine.

Truly America had again nursed and developed a seafearing population. Moreover, for several years there had been contractual relations and a substantial measure of cooperation between those who owned the ships and the marine labor organizations who furnished the personnel. It seemed as if America's future upon the sea was assured.

Unfortunately, the union busters in the shipowners' ranks have been in the ascendency since the days of easy pickings inaugurated during the late war came to a rather sudden end. The old reactionaries of the Robert Dollar type, who bitterly fought the Seamen's bill and have never become reconciled to the new status of the American seamen, hand down the new marine labor policy.

The unions fully realized that a downward adjustment of seamen's wages to meet the reduced cost of living was inevitable. They never seriously argued against the proposed fifteen per cent reduction. But they did strenuously protest against the imposition of terms and conditions which would force the American boy from American ships.

In the negotiations with the Shipping Board which preceded the strike, the unions asked that preference in employment be given to members of the unions. This was denied.

The unions then asked preference for American citizens. This was denied, first hesitatingly, then firmly when an emphatic "No" came from the private operators.

The unions asked if the three watches (meaning eight hours work in twenty-four) would be retained. The answer was "No." The twelve-hour work-day is to be reestablished.

The unions asked if permission would be granted (as heretofore) for authorized representatives to visit the men on the ships outside of regular working hours, to be present when the men are paid off, and to speak for them (represent them) with the shipowners. And again the answer was "No."

Obviously the old line reactionaries were determined to go back to pre-war conditions and to destroy or at least nullify the legitimate functions of the unions. They felt that this was the time to do it. And who will dispute their judgment as to the selection of the time?

The union representatives did their utmost to prevent a tie-up. As a last resort they voluntarily made the proposal to leave the entire question in the hands of President Harding and agreed to abide by his decision. But the die was cast as far as the owners were concerned. Nothing would satisfy them except abject submission to their terms—terms which meant that the unions agreed to sign their own death warrant and with it the absolute assurance that Americans would surrender the sea to any aliens willing to accept the humiliating and degrading conditions offered.

In the meantime—what is taking place in Great Britain, our chief competitor for the mastery of the sea?

The National Maritime Board of Great Britain, organized during the war to adjust maritime labor disputes, is still functioning. The National Sailors' and Firemen's Union of Great Britain and Ireland is still officially recognized and working in perfect harmony and cooperation with the shipowners. A reduction in pay approximating fifteen per cent was mutually agreed to at a meeting held in London on April 22nd. Of course, the British shipowners did not commit the unpardonable folly of declaring a war of extermination on the Seamen's Union at a time when goodwill and cooperation between employer and employee are more essential to success than ever before.

Doubtless, the rather extensive British interests in American shipping must be well pleased with the present turn of affairs. The only serious pretender

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to Britannia's rule of the wave is America. And just as long as America's shipowners and seamen can be kept busy fighting each other there is little danger for the Union Jack. Only when Americans unite, when they learn the lesson that the shipowners' union-busting proclivities are too expensive for America, only then shall we as a nation become a real contender for the mastery of the sea. For, after all, the wage cost of operation is but a small item in the total cost. Greater efficiency by skilled American crews can easily make up for any trifling advantage which may be enjoyed by our competitors in this respect. The American Seamen's Unions have actually opened schools and appropriated funds from their own treasuries to establish greater skill and efficiency. They are anxious and eager for genuine cooperation to the end that the Stars and Stripes may be carried on the masthead of our merchant ships in every corner of the seven seas. But the seamen cannot win the fight alone. American sea power is too big a prize to be had for the mere asking. It can be had and held only so long as America deems it worth having and resolutely deals with the coolie-labor patriot who would trade our destiny upon the sea for a mess of stale and unsalted pottage.

ANDREW FURUSETH.

Woman's Inferiority Complex

WHEN shall we have, not a man-made or a woman-made world, but a *human* world? Women are still far behind as regards human rights, and must catch up with men before sex is put out of politics, and the world made human.

Are American women, now the voting equals of men, winning their place as men's political and social equals? Have they demanded, or been given, an equal partnership in the control of political parties, of national and state government? Have they demanded that ability, not sex, determine opportunity and pay in business and industry, in education, law, medicine, and the civil service? Have they demanded the removal of all remaining discriminations in law or custom?

No, they have not, nor have they made any apparent headway since their enfranchisement last year.

Political parties, national, state, and county are still controlled by men. We have as yet no women United States senators, or governors, or mayors of large cities, and comparatively few women members of state legislatures. We have one woman member of Congress, to be sure, but we had advanced that far in 1916, before the ratification of the national suffrage amendment. Important political appointments following President Harding's inauguration went without exception to men. We lost a woman commissioner of the District of Columbia. To offset this the newspapers promise us that the head of President Harding's visionary Department of Public Welfare will be a woman. When this halcyon day arrives, women will have a ratio of one to ten in the Cabinet! Although there are approximately twelve million women wage earners, we are still discriminated against in the industrial world, in the teaching profession, in schools of law, medicine, science and theology, and male, not human psychology, continues to shape opinion. For example, soothing syrup in the form of advice to women voters to "educate themselves first before taking an actual part in politics" is being administered in large, sugary doses in articles in newspapers and women's magazines (written chiefly by men), which are apparently swallowed without protest.

The opinions of some prominent professional and business women in a recently published newspaper interview would be amusing were the whole subject not so serious. All agreed no woman is yet qualified to be a mayor of Greater New York!

"Eventually, but not now," breezily replied a successful real estate broker.

Said an assistant district attorney: "Of course I believe women are capable of running New York, —in the far, far future. Women are still infants in the political world, and it will take several years, perhaps as many as ten, to break them into the big jobs of the city."

Another, a successful woman banker, held this firm opinion: "It will be ten or fifteen years before women can hold down the big executive positions. We are too young politically to have had the necessary experience."

At the same time the national president of a large woman's organization is going through the country declaring in her speeches that women should have years of training in citizenship before venturing into politics; that the issue is "good citizenship versus woman politicians!"

And we learn on unquestioned authority that Miss Alice Robertson, the new member of Congress from Oklahoma (an anti-suffragist), recently confessed at a luncheon given in her honor by women members of the press, that she had been asked by men high in the administration to recommend some able women for government appointments, but that she didn't know any! In view of the calibre of men who are daily appointed to important positions, we refuse to argue with Miss Robertson.

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But what is the average woman voter thinking of this new application of a "double standard"? Does she see that the old anti-suffragist cry of "woman's place is the home" has been succeeded by "women must be educated first"? Admitting the importance of training in citizenship, should we not take the bull firmly by the horns and declare emphatically: "If women require training for public office, men also require it?" Just as we declared in our fight for suffrage: "Women are fit to vote if men are, and there must be no further sex discrimination."

Why aren't we making a vigorous fight against this new double standard, instead of apparently passively accepting it? What is the chief obstacle to winning our political, economic, and social equality today, with the vote in our hands? The chief obstacle is not men,—it is the humbleness, the timidity, the fear in the hearts and minds of women themselves, planted there by centuries of teaching that woman is the inferior sex. If we could only change our opinion of ourselves (ignoring men's traditional opinions), our shackles would drop off instantly. But in our man-made world we still permit the highest praise of a woman to be, "She has a masculine mind." Men and women still accept as the most disparaging criticism of a man, "He's a regular old woman."

Many women are in the grip of an "inferiority complex." Otherwise they would not continue to endure double standards and the consequent limitation of opportunity, not only through man's actual control of the material world, but through his almost exclusive interpretation of woman. Although men have been hampered in their development by our system of civilization, women have been more hampered. It is pathetic to consider that no woman's nature has ever had a chance to develop freely. Through the ages we have been shaped by man's conception of what we should be. Woman is portrayed in literature, drama, movies and newspapers only as man sees her. Women writers (with rare exceptions) follow man's interpretation. They have no other.

A striking example is the case of Margaret Fuller. Until Katharine Anthony's recent biography appeared our knowledge of our first great feminist was chiefly derived from the memoirs of the Transcendentalists, the friends and comrades who knew her best. Their picture is a caricature. Even Emerson, who gave her his measured friendship, writes cautious praise. From Hawthorne and Lowell, too, we get an impression of an extraordinary, eccentric creature, whose foibles are to be laughed at, whose presence somehow caused uneasiness to their philosophers' souls and must be avoided. Hawthorne's portrait of her as Zenobia in the Blithedale Romance, and his references to her in his diary, are not flattering. Were these men unable to appreciate her genius, an unseemly thing in woman? Lowell lampooned her savagely in his Fable for Critics, and continued his ridicule and invective in his private correspondence, apparently because as literary critic of the New York Tribune she described his poetry as shallow and thin, and likely to be forgotten by posterity. An entirely different figure from that drawn by her masculine contemporaries emerges in Miss Anthony's biography, which is based largely on source material. We see her as a very human person who bore few resentments, a devoted daughter and sister who gave her best years to putting her brothers through college, a woman of considerable charm in spite of her enormous learning, a writer and critic of originality and power, a feminist in a day and atmosphere which required heroic qualities of mind and heart, whose championship of women as the underdogs of civilization cost her her one hundred per cent respectability. We learn that all women are forever indebted to her. But this knowledge of a truly great human being we do not owe to her male colleagues. The "contradictory and pretentious caricature" they drew in their memoirs of Margaret Fuller shows, according to Miss Anthony, a curious lack of feeling and appreciation of their dead comrade. It seems that a woman biographer was necessary to reveal her to us. How many other great women have been lost to posterity by man's inability to appreciate them? Truly not women alone, but men and the world must have lost much through the almost exclusive recording of life by men.

A classic example of the power of male psychology is the case of Jeannette Rankin, the first woman member of Congress, who is remembered chiefly through newspaper reports that she wept when she voted against war. Whether this is literally true or not, was it not worthy of respect that she showed natural emotion, as some men members did, at voting on such a momentous question? But she was ridiculed and pilloried in the press the country over for having shown the weakness of tears. And yet the same newspapers described without jibes or jeers Claude Kitchin, the Democratic leader, as speaking against the war resolution "with sobs in his voice and tears streaming down his face." Nor was Charles M. Schwab ridiculed when he broke down before a recent Congressional investigating committee. When a man weeps, it appears, it is manly and noble, when a woman weeps, even under the same circumstances, it is womanish and weak. One of the most significant features of Miss

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Rankin's case is that many women throughout the country joined the hue and cry of the newspapers and politicians against her for weeping when she voted against war. They swallowed hook, line, and sinker the double standard created by male newspaper psychology against their own sex.

Another illustration of the double standard and of woman's inferiority complex I take from my recent campaign for the United States Senate in Nevada. I ran as an Independent, and found that although women are less controlled by "gang" or party rule than men, and that more women than men undoubtedly placed principle above party and voted for me, a goodly number of women voters were still deeply afflicted with a sense of woman's inferiority to man. "The United States Senatorship's too big a job for a woman," some would say, or, "Why doesn't she run for some lower office first?" "Yes, she ought to begin by running for dog-catcher," my ardent young organizers would reply. And then they would tone down their impatience by pointing out that "running for some lower office first" is not a pre-requisite for men candidates. They would go further and show that two out of Nevada's three members of Congress had never held a lower office before they were sent to Washington, and that these men had boasted of it, and were elected! But it is difficult to dislodge with mere logic a Freudian complex in the minds of some women; the services of a feminist pscho-analyst are required. The reply of Madame Curie to an interviewer upon her recent arrival in America is significant. "How can I tell you if women are less intelligent than men?" she answered. "It is absurd to divide intelligence into male and female. There are intelligent *people*, and there are people who are not so intelligent."

In spite of discouraging features, the attitude of women toward our continued inequality is not hopeless. Considering our teaching and economic dependence for generations, it is remarkable that we have lifted up our souls and developed the courage and independence to advance as far as we are today. We are beginning, many of us, to see that our training as mothers, teachers, housewives, bread-winners, as suffragists and reformers working for years to amend the state constitutions and laws, and then the national Constitution, is at least the equivalent of men's training in the somewhat muddy pool of party politics. We are realizing that the initiative for the removal of all remaining discriminations must come from us, and that equal participation in state and national government is essential to winning legal, economic and social equality. The iron has entered our souls, and we are shaking off the complex. More and more of us are declaring, without the timid qualifications of the woman's page or the women's magazines, "Women are ready *now*," whether the office be justice of the peace, mayor of New York, member of Congress or of the Cabinet.

When we have changed our own minds about our "inferiority," the mind of the world will change, and men and women both will have a better chance for a human world.

ANNE MARTIN.

Divided China

I

ABOUT six months ago the Peking government issued an edict proclaiming the unification of China. On May 5th Sun Yat Sen was formally inaugurated in Canton as president of all China. Thus China has within six months been twice unified, once from the northern standpoint and once from the southern. Each act of "unification" is in fact a symbol of the division of China, a division expressing differences of language, temperament, history, and political policy as well as of geography, persons and factions. This division has been one of the outstanding facts of Chinese history since the overthrow of the Manchus ten years ago and it has manifested itself in intermittent civil war. Yet there are two other statements which are equally true, although they flatly contradict each other and the one just made. One statement is that so far as the people of China are concerned there is no real division on geographical lines, but only the common division occurring everywhere between conservatives and progressives. The other is that instead of two divisions in China, there are at least five, two parties in both the north and south, and another in the central or Yangtse region, each one of the five splitting up again more or less on factional and provincial lines. And so far as the future is concerned, probably this last statement is the most significant of the three. That all three statements are true is what makes Chinese politics so difficult to understand even in their larger features.

By the good fortune of circumstances we were

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in Canton when the inauguration occurred. Peking and Canton are a long way apart in more than distance. There is little exchange of actual news between the two places; what filters through into either city and gets published consists mostly of rumors tending to discredit the other city. In Canton, the monarchy is constantly being restored in Peking; and in Peking, Canton is Bolshevized at least once a week, while every other week open war breaks out between the adherents of Sun Yat Sen, and General Chen Kwang Ming, the civil governor of the province. There is nothing to give the impression—even in circles which accept the Peking government only as an evil necessity—that the pretensions of Sun Yat Sen represent anything more than the desires of a small and discredited group to get some slight power for themselves at the expense of national unity. Even in Fukien, the province next north of Kwantung, one found little but gossip whose effect was to minimize the importance of the southern government. In foreign circles in the north as well as in liberal Chinese circles upon the whole, the feeling is general that bad as the de facto Peking government may be, it represents the cause of national unity, while the southern government represents a perpetuation of that division of China which makes her weak and which offers the standing invitation to foreign intrigue and aggression. Only occasionally during the last few months has some returned traveller timidly advanced the opinion that we had the "wrong dope" on the south, and that they were really trying "to do something down there."

Consequently there was little preparation on my part for the spectacle afforded in Canton during the week of May 5th. This was the only demonstration I have seen in China during the last two years which gave any evidence of being a spontaneous popular movement. New Yorkers are accustomed to crowds, processions, street decorations and accompanying enthusiasm. I doubt if New York has ever seen a demonstration which surpassed that of Canton in size, noise, color or spontaneity—in spite of tropical rains. The country people flocked in in such masses, that, being unable to find accommodation even in the river boats, they kept up a parade all night. Guilds and localities which were not able to get a place in the regular procession organized minor ones on their own account on the day before and after the official demonstration. Making all possible allowance for the intensity of Cantonese local loyalty and the fact that they might be celebrating a Cantonese affair rather than a principle, the scene was sufficiently impressive to revise one's preconceived ideas and to make one try to find out what it is that gives the southern movement its vitality.

A demonstration may be popular and still be superficial in significance. However one found foreigners on the ground—at least Americans—saying that in the last few months the men in power in Canton were the only officials in China who were actually doing something for the people instead of filling their own pockets and magnifying their personal power. Even the northern newspapers had not entirely omitted reference to the suppression of licensed gambling. On the spot one learned that this suppression was not only genuine and thorough, but that it meant a renunciation of an annual revenue of nearly ten million dollars on the part of a government whose chief difficulty is financial, and where—apart from motives of personal squeeze—it would have been easy to argue that at least temporarily the end justified the means in retaining this source of revenue. English papers throughout China have given much praise to the government of Hong Kong because it has cut down its opium revenue from eight to four millions annually with the plan for ultimate extinction. Yet Hong Kong is prosperous, it has not been touched by civil war, and it only needs revenue for ordinary civil purposes, not as a means of maintaining its existence in a crisis.

Under the circumstances, the action of the southern government was hardly less than heroic. This renunciation is the most sensational act of the Canton government, but one soon learns that it is the accompaniment of a considerable number of constructive administrative undertakings. Among the most notable are attempts to reform the local magistracies throughout the province, the establishment of municipal government in Canton—something new in China where local officials are all centrally appointed and controlled—based upon the American Commission plan, and directed by graduates of schools of political science in the United States; plans for introducing local self-government throughout the province; a scheme for introduction of universal primary education in Canton to be completed in three steps.

These reforms are provincial and local. They are part of a general movement against centralization and toward local autonomy which is gaining headway all over China, a protest against the appointment of officials from Peking and the management of local affairs in the interests of factions—and pocket-books—whose chief interest in local affairs is what can be extracted in the way of profit. For the only analogue of provincial government in China at the present time is the carpet bag government of the south in the days follow-

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ing our civil war. These things explain the restiveness of the country, including central as well as southern provinces, under Peking domination. But they do not explain the setting up of a new national, or federal government, with the election of Mr. Sun Yat Sen as its president. To understand this event it is necessary to go back into history.

In June, 1917, the parliament in Peking was about to adopt a constitution. The parliament was controlled by leaders of the old revolutionary party who had been at loggerheads with Yuan and with the executive generally. The latter accused them of being obstructionists, wasting time in discussing and theorizing when the country needed action. Japan had changed her tactics regarding the participation of China in the war, and having got her position established through the Twenty-one Demands, saw a way of controlling Chinese arsenals and virtually amalgamating the Chinese armies with her own through supervising China's entrance into the war. The British and French were pressing desperately for the same end. Parliament was slow to act, and Tang Shao Yi, Sun Yat Sen and other southern leaders were averse, since they regarded the war as none of China's business and were upon the whole more anti-British than anti-German—a fact which partly accounts for the share of British journals in the present press propaganda against the Canton government. But what brought matters to a head was the fact that the constitution which was about to be adopted eliminated the military governors or tuchuns of the provinces, and restored the supremacy of civil authority which had been destroyed by Yuan Shi Kai, in addition to introducing a policy of decentralization. Coached by members of the so-called progressive party which claimed to be constitutionalist and which had a factionalist interest in overthrowing the revolutionaries who controlled the legislative branch if not the executive, the military governors demanded that the president suspend parliament and dismiss the legislators. This demand was more than passively supported by all the Allied diplomats in Peking with the honorable exception of the American legation. The president weakly yielded and issued an edict dispelling parliament, virtually admitting in the document the illegality of his action. Less than a month afterwards he was a refugee in the Dutch legation on account of the farce of monarchical restoration staged by Chang Shun—who at the present time is again coming to the front in the north as adjutant to the plans of Chang Tsolin, the present "strong man" of China. Later, elections were held and a new parliament elected. This parliament has been functioning as the legislature of China at Peking and elected the president, Shu Shi Chang, the head of the government recognized by the foreign Powers:—in short it is the Chinese government from an international standpoint, the Peking government from a domestic standpoint.

The revolutionary members of the old parliament never recognized the legality of their dispersal, and consequently refused to admit the legal status of the new parliament, called by them the bogus parliament, and of the president elected by it, especially as the new legislative body was not elected according to the rules laid down by the constitution. Under the lead of some of the old members, the old parliament, called by its opponents the defunct parliament, has led an intermittent existence ever since. Claiming to be the sole authentic constitutional body of China, it finally elected Dr. Sun president of China and thus prepared the act of the fifth of May, already reported.

Such is the technical and formal background of the present southern government. Its attack upon the legality of the Peking government is doubtless technically justified. But for various reasons its own positive status is open to equally grave doubts. The terms "bogus" and "defunct," so freely cast at each other, both seem to an outsider to be justified. It is less necessary to go into the reasons which appear to invalidate the position of the southern parliament because of the belated character of its final action. A protest which waits four years to assert itself in positive action is confronted not with legal technicalities but with accomplished facts. In my opinion, legality for legality, the southern government has a shade the better of the technical argument. But in the face of a government which has foreign recognition and which has maintained itself after a fashion for four years, a legal shadow is a precarious political basis. It is wiser to regard the southern government as a revolutionary government, which in addition to the prestige of continuing the revolutionary movement of ten years ago has also a considerable sentimental asset as a protest of constitutionalism against the military usurpations of the Peking government.

It is an open secret that the southern movement has not received the undivided support of all the forces present in Canton which are opposed to the northern government. Tang Shao Yi, for example, was notable for his absence at the time of the inauguration, having found it convenient to visit the graves of his ancestors at that time. The provincial governor, General Chen Kwang Ming, was in

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favor of confining efforts to the establishment of provincial autonomy and the encouragement of similar movements in other provinces, looking forward to an eventual federal, or confederated, government of at least all the provinces south of the Yangtse. Many of his generals wanted to postpone action until Kwantung province had made a military alliance with the generals in the other southwestern provinces, so as to be able to resist the north should the latter undertake a military expedition. Others thought the technical legal argument for the new move was being overworked, and while having no objections to an out and out revolutionary movement against Peking, thought that the time for it had not yet come. They are counting on Chang Tso Lin's attempting a monarchical restoration and think that the popular revulsion against that move would create the opportune time for such a movement as has now been prematurely undertaken. However in spite of reports of open strife freely circulated by British and Peking government newspapers, most of the opposition elements are now loyally suppressing their opposition and supporting the government of Sun Yat Sen. A compromise has been arranged by which the federal government will confine its attention to foreign affairs, leaving provincial matters wholly in the hands of Governor Chen and his adherents. There is still room for friction however, especially as to the control of revenues, since at present there are hardly enough funds for one administration, let alone two.

JOHN DEWEY.

A Revolutionist of Another Age

PERHAPS it is because I am so dominated by a masterly portrait of him that I always see him in an attitude of quiescence—his hat upon his knees, his head slightly drooped, his eyes looking out on the world with abnegation. Almost in vain do I try to see him in other attitudes—taking his glass of whiskey at the dinner-table, while color comes into his cheeks and he warms into a real discourse; handling books at the stalls along the quays; or sitting upright in the arm-chair before the fire, growing keen as he talked about the men and books that he knew well.

A poet who knew them said of the Irish revolutionists of that epoch that they were the most simple-minded of men. Perhaps he should have said that they were oddly inexperienced men. There were gaps in their minds, for they had spent in prisons the years in which idealists become sophisticated and possessive. They had made of their imprisonment a retirement from the world. (Perhaps we only knew the exceptions, and the men whose souls had been turned into bitterness did not last into our day.) When they talked of sex or of birth they were as shy as convent girls. They lived unmarried lives, and one never heard them speak of a love affair. Once I knew an old man who had been a political prisoner; he was of a very different order of intelligence and culture from the men I am thinking of now. He had been in prison from his twenties to his forties. He talked to me of a girl he had known, describing how he had walked out with her, how he had sat with her in her house, the words he said to her, and what she answered back. "But you did not marry her," I said. "No," said he, "I only courted her in my own mind." But I never heard from the lips of these men—I only knew three or four anyway—that they had courted even in their minds.

This one, the most notable of them all, lived unmarried, lodging when I knew him in an indifferent sort of a side street. A church was across the way from where he lived, and I remember that the bells would ring for two, or perhaps for three masses while I stayed a morning with him. A glass of warm milk would be before him. He would renew it often out of a saucepan that warmed on the grate. The coals burned dully. I often feared that there would be a fire there some day, for a trail of newspapers always laid from the grate to those little tables on which he kept collections of books, and from the little tables to the bookshelves that were around the walls. He was so oblivious that a fire might start unnoticed around him. The little tables had special collections of Irish books—on one books published in Cork, on another books published in Limerick, on a third books published in Dundalk, and so forth. I think that what he mainly read was poetry, and an instance of his sound judgment in poetry comes to me now. I had spoken of that lyric of Yeats's that begins "Autumn is over the long leaves that love us, and over the mice in the barley sheaves," and I said that it was curious that he had got a Swinburnian rhythm with a characteristically Yeatsean sentiment. "It is Swinburnian in another way," he said, "for the words are mainly Saxon." I was surprised to hear this said, for I had thought of Swinburne as drawing on Romance for his language. But I found that when I looked into Swinburne again that his language was mainly Saxon.

From his shelves I took those novels of Henry James's that are still my stock-in-trade when I talk of that novelist—Portrait of a Lady, The Princess Cassimassima, What Maisie Knew. Turgeniev he had known in Paris and he could well expound him. It would have thrilled me, I know, to have read the novel of the revolution, On the Eve, in a copy

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borrowed from these shelves. I must have read it before. The novel of Turgeniev's that I had from him was a sad and ineffectual story that begins with an old man abandoned to loneliness—Torrents of Spring.

Walter Pater he admired, but, by his own account, not disinterestedly. The Boer War and the writings of Walter Pater had revealed to him the decadence of the English. When their language had come to be written as a dead language, he said, it was an indication that the people had come to their end.

His mind was too detached, to have permitted him to engage in those endless plots and combinations that are the day's work of an ex-revolutionist. He read and he meditated. And yet, singularly enough, his fineness and his integrity had not become a tradition; they were a dim, but living influence. He was an heroic memorial and an heroic prophecy.

In those days it did not matter that for him revolution always spelled out nationality — Greece, Italy, Bulgaria. He was emphatically not a proletarian. Indeed he railed at the discoverer of the real source of revolutionary power in Ireland, blaming him as a man who had degraded the idea of an Irish revolution by attaching it to anything so mercenary as the reduction or the abolition of farm-rents. He used a phrase that made insurrectionists uncomfortable—"There are things that a man may not do even for the sake of saving his country."

He spoke of Kropotkin, whom he had met with Stepniak, and I remember his contrasting the two anarchists—"Stepniak," he said, "was a Mongolian; Kropotkin absolutely the Aryan." But I never heard him speak of Karl Marx.

With that finely-modelled head of his drooping a little, but yet without any consciousness of his being out of place, he would preside at gatherings that in those days seemed fantastical enough — gatherings that were for the formation of a new league or a new union for Irish independence. They would have him there, these young men, not altogether because he was the most notable of those who had carried that dream into action, not altogether because he looked so fine, not altogether because it was entirely fit and proper to have him there, but because there was in him a virtue, an integrity that gave a spiritual value to words and program. This old man who looked like Don Quixote left companionless was an oriflamme, a palladium.

Hence one poet made his name into a refrain in the most ringing of his poems, hence another poet dedicated to him the most spirited of his pieces, hence a third made a line of verse thrill with his name. And a realist of another generation, the most acrid writer that his country had produced, wrote of his funeral as of the passing away of a soul from amongst a shallow people.

Once, when the first plays of what was to be a national theatre were being given, a red-covered arm-chair had been placed in the front row of that little hall for some distinguished patron. Soon a rumor ran amongst the players concerning the occupant of the red chair. From the wings, startled, those who had to do with the plays looked out on the audience. And there, seated in the red chair, eyeglass in eye, granite face raised, massively attentive, was that Celtic Irishman who had governed India and who had been slipped in to make a government for Ireland. And across the aisle, lonely, but with a face quickened, was that old man who had in his hands the succession that we looked for. The men were in the wrong chairs. We felt that in the beginning of the game a bad shuffle had been made in the cards.

PADRAIC COLUM.

Soviet Industrial Organization

FANTASY could hardly devise a situation less auspicious for nationalization of industries than that of Russia in 1918. A country with a capitalist system only thirty years old; with brand new industrial establishments modelled after western patterns forming a strange contrast to a backward home life; with manufacturers freely exploiting a vast, protected, internal market and consequently not spurred to efficiency by competition; with punctuality and mechanical exactness, those virtues of the capitalist system, hardly known to a generally lax population; with a very thin crust of the working-class in possession of a minimum of technical skill, and with foremen and managers largely drawn from abroad,—a country of this kind would have formed poor ground for nationalization experiments even in normal times. Added to this were: the collapse of production and transportation after four years of war; the cessation of imports which prior to 1914 had amounted to from 1.2 to 1.3 billions of rubles yearly—mainly machines, industrial equipment, chemicals, cotton; the demoralization of the workingmen as a result of war and revolution; the boycott by the intelligentsia of the new system.

The Russians were stirred by hatred of oppression and by a vague though powerful impulse to free themselves. Without much planning, the workingmen of Russia had started the process of nationalization under the Kerensky regime. It was then called "workmen's control" and consisted of shop committees invading the business offices and

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arbitrarily establishing standards of profit,—but it was potential nationalization. The owners would not and could not work under the Damocles sword of dispossession. Their attitude was branded as sabotage by the revolutionary workmen, but it need not have been a conscious sabotage, though in many instances it was. Former absolute masters of industrial plants could not peacefully cooperate with potential absolute masters from a new class. Things went from bad to worse. One side or the other had to quit. The October revolution only gave legislative formulation to the then existing distribution of power. Even so, the unnatural combination lasted eight months after the ascendency of the Soviets. Managing boards and central committees of the various industries still admitted representatives of capital with a minority of not more than one third. Almost a year after the revolution, the system showed workmen in power dragging after their chariot the unhappy, nominal owners who were shorn of all privileges but heaped with abuse and made responsible for ill-success.

The system had to be cleared. The decree of June 28, 1918, ordering the nationalization of the larger plants—those with a capital of not less than half a million rubles—showed a way out of the tangle. Nationalization of the joint stock companies, the banks and the merchant marine, was a natural consequence. The proletariat was victorious. The end of 1918 was marked by a riot of dispossession all over the country. Not till the end of 1920, however, was the process accomplished in the rough. Out of 6,775 industrial establishments (exclusive of mines) of which account was taken, 2,522 were nationalized before October 1, 1919; by April 1, 1920, the number grew to 4,140, and by the end of 1920, to 4,420, embracing the most vital and well equipped factories, plants and shops. It is thus evident, that the management of nationalized industries in Russia is hardly more than two and a half years old.

Two tasks confronted the Soviet republic after the first wave of nationalization: first, to secure fuel and raw materials for its industries, second, to establish a new industrial management. The first task was not accomplished till the end of 1919. The gold and iron ore of Siberia, the iron, copper and coal of the Ural, the cotton of Turkestan, the oil of Baku, the coal of the Donetz region and the steel of the Yekaterinoslav region were secured only after the victories of the Red army over Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenitch, Krasnov and a number of minor enemies within and without. But this very work of restoring to Russia her natural resources made the work of organization extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible.

The organization of the management was not a well planned and executed system. It grew with the revolution, undergoing adaptations or catastrophic changes. It started with shop committees of employees managing "their" concerns. Syndicalist tendencies were marked at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919. To put it in the words of V. Miliutin, "The workingmen thought it natural that the management of nationalized enterprises should pass into the hands of the respective labor unions. The railroad workers considered the railroads almost as their property, which should be in their complete possession; the employees of the merchant marine established the same practice in relation to their craft. Similarly the workmen of nationalized factories considered them their own." This tendency was soon checked. Centralization was dictated by war emergency and by need of an organized distribution of man power, raw materials and fuel. The state was gradually gaining hold over the factories and mines. A central committee of nationalized industries and main committees for each branch of industry were established. The work was greatly aided by the labor unions, which, according to the practice prevailing up to the end of 1919, furnished one-third of the membership of all such economic organizations, the rest consisting of state appointees including technical advisers. The committees were large and the work of management was at first dissipated in endless discussions. As an example, the central committee of the textile industries may be cited. It was established by the decision of a convention of the textile workers' union in February, 1918, and consisted of seventy members: thirty from the union elected at their national convention, fifteen from the owners—who at that time were not yet entirely dispossessed—and twenty-five representatives of the various administrative and economic organizations of the country—including one member of the non-existing peasants' organization of flax growers,—so far went the forethought of the founders in their reverence for industrial democracy. This body elected a praesidium of eleven to discharge current duties. Both bodies were incapable of quick and uncompromising actions. Gradually the labor group assumed all responsibilities. The owners' group ceased to attend the sessions. But even a membership of thirty was too cumbersome. By the end of 1918 it shrank to seven. In a similar fashion, the shop committees which originally managed the nationalized factories, were superseded by individual managers appointed by the state with the approval of the labor unions. The system was gradually straightening out, strengthening its machinery, gaining control over the factors of production, and making it its task to eliminate waste and increase productivity.

As it appeared towards the beginning of 1921, the management of Russian industries was a highly centralized bureaucratic body. At the head of it was the Highest Council of National Economy, a body of thirteen with the rights of a people's commissariat (corresponding to a ministry in constitutional countries). Its members were elected at a national convention of the local councils of national economy with the approval of the national convention of the labor unions. The Highest Council of National Economy is the head of all Russian industries but not the manager of all Russian production and distribution. In addition to it there exist the Commissariat of Transportation, the Commissariat of Supplies, which collects the agricultural products from the village population and distributes both those products and the manufactured goods, the Commissariat of Labor, now incorporated in the national committee of the labor unions but formerly independent, the Commissariat of Agriculture, and the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, besides the various extraordinary commissions for the supply of the army which flourished in war-time and are now losing importance. This division, in many ways artificial, is a remnant of former days, and, as is true of many a survival, it is in process of elimination.

The realm of the Highest Council of National Economy is thus not definitely circumscribed. In the main, however, it is supposed to manage the chief industries of the country. Its work is carried out by three kinds of subsidiary organizations: commissions, administrative branches and industrial departments of the commissions. The most important are (a) the Commission on Production, whose task it is "to collect the various production programs of the various branches of industry, to revise and unify them

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and submit them to the praesidium (of the Highest Council)," and (b) the Council of Provision and Distribution which assigns to each branch of industry the raw materials and semi-manufactures obtained from the mines and factories and from the Commissariat of Supplies. The administrative branches embrace: the Branch of Communication with Local Councils, the Branch of Finance, the Branch of Inspection, the Branch of Statistics etc. The industrial departments each correspond to a separate branch of industry and represent special committees supervising the industries. The departments, however, do not occupy themselves with the actual management of plants or groups of plants. This work is done by main and central committees (the names are used promiscuously) established for each industry. The number of such committees at the end of 1920 was fifty-nine and it is through them that the industrial departments carry out the decisions of the Highest Council. The chief industrial departments were those of (1) metals, (2) mines, (3) chemicals, (4) foodstuffs, (5) textiles, (6) leather, (7) clothing, (8) electric works, (9) polygraphy (printing works etc.), (10) automobiles, (11) peat, (12) state constructions, (13) lumber and timber. The number of main committees in each department varies according to the industries embraced by that department. The jurisdiction of the departments and committees is in process of change. Some departments show a tendency to absorb the activities of the committees. Thus the Department of Textiles is the actual managing body of the industry and has only executive offices for the various sections of its work. On the other hand, some main committees succeed in freeing themselves from the supervision of their departments and becoming directly connected with the Highest Council.

Each main or central committee has a great deal of independence within its realm. It is often likened by the Russians to the board of directors of a trust in a capitalist country, but it seems to be more concerned with technical problems of production than a board of directors. The factories and plants under each main or central committee are combined in clusters or groups ("bushes" in Russian) according to location. Each group of factories has its own management. The machinery, equipment, raw material, fuel, man power, technical aid of the group are pooled together. Its financing is also done from one centre. The lowest unit of the system is an individual factory or plant. Thus going down the scale of the organization we find: The Highest Council of National Economy—the Industrial Department—the main committee—the group management—the individual factory. The members of the main committees—ordinarily not more than three in number—are appointed by the Highest Council with the consent of the respective labor union. The management of groups (bushes) and plants are appointed by the main committee also with the consent of the union. The group is ordinarily headed by a body of not more than three; in the individual factory, the single manager prevails. In 1920, out of 2,483 factories of which statistics were collected, 2,183 had single managers. The number of workmen in the managers' office is large. Out of 1,124 managers or members of managing bodies in the textile industry in 1920, 726 were former workmen and 398 belonged to the former technical personnel.

Alongside of the management of the individual plant, works the local shop committee elected by the workmen. It forms the nucleus of the labor union, and its main task is to organize and educate the workmen and increase the productivity of their labor, but it often cooperates with the management in a number of purely technical problems.

This is the machinery in its vertical divisions. Horizontally it is divided into province councils of national economy and county councils of national economy forming departments of the local Soviets and appointed by the executive committee of the Soviets with the consent of the province committees or county committees of the labor unions. The subdivisions of the province councils correspond to the industrial departments of the Highest Council. In war-time, all the important plants were managed from Moscow, the province councils being disregarded. The eighth all-Russian congress of Soviets (December, 1920) decided that all the work of management should be conducted through the local economic councils.

Casting a glance at the work of this organization we find the following main characteristics:

1. It suffers from an over-abundance of offices and a lack of clearly defined jurisdiction. Under a uniformly managed industrial system, the railroads cannot be independent, and the commissariat of supplies cannot stand as a sovereign body. The Highest Council of National Economy has a Department of Agriculture and a Department of General Distribution and a Department of Foreign Trade, duplicating in a measure the work of other commissariats. On the other hand, it has joint commissions with other commissariats and interlocking boards. This clogs the machinery and creates an interminable amount of red tape. The main committees have become a byword in Russia for their bureaucratic methods. However, the system is improving. A commission on a uniform economic plan is in session, and an important work of consolidation was done by the last convention of councils of national economy in May, 1921. A process of decentralization with a tendency toward increasing the initiative of local groups is taking place.

2. In order to combine and unify all the economic activities of the country, a temporary military Council of Labor and Defence was established in the course of the war, with dictatorial powers. After the termination of the war, the council remained as an interdepartmental body, a sort of economic clearing house, pending the working out of a general uniform economic plan which does not seem to be far off.

3. The productivity of labor has decreased on an average forty-five per cent, according to official statistics. According to Strumilin, the decrease was only thirty-five per cent. This is due primarily to worn-out machinery and to the diminished vitality of the workers. In 1908-16, the daily food of a city worker in Russia was equivalent to 3,820 calories, in 1921 it is equivalent to 2,830. Two thousand being the minimum required for the maintenance of the body without work, the worker has now 45.6 per cent of his former surplus of energy to be put into work. Mental drawbacks due to demoralization etc. are on the decline and have almost disappeared. The average number of workdays in 1920 was 241 as against 268 in 1914. The decrease was due first to sickness (19 days in 1920 as against 7.4 in 1913-16), second, to stoppage in consequence of the disorder in the economic system. According to all testimony, the willingness of the worker to work is now beyond question, provided he is assured ample food and continuous employment. The rôle of the labor unions in this respect should not be undervalued.

4. The output of the Russian industries in 1920 ranged from twenty to thirty per cent of the pre-war output,

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sometimes, as in the production of cast iron, falling below ten per cent. The imperfection of the new management may account for a certain part of this decline. It seems, however, that it was mainly caused by six years of war, by the impossibility of obtaining machinery and materials from abroad, by the temporary loss of many provinces rich in minerals and fuels, and by the impaired vitality of the workers. Under such conditions, even the maintenance of the industrial skeleton seems a considerable achievement. Progress of any kind, however slight, appears a great victory. Progress of considerable extent should be recorded in the coal production of the Moscow area (in 1920 an increase of 175 per cent over that of 1918 and 1919), in the Ural coal region (an increase of 150 per cent as compared with 1918), in the repair of locomotives and rolling stock, in the construction of subsidiary railway lines, in the construction of electric power plants (Shatury and the Svir-Volkhov works), in the manufacture of substitutes, in the construction of motors and aeroplanes, and in the extraction of peat and shale for fuel. Many experiments in the technical field were successfully conducted and many inventions made.

5. The industrial system is gradually changing from a war to a peace footing. Accordingly, the system of "shock industries," demanding that certain plants and factories be operated on high scale of productivity at any cost, a system which yielded a maximum of production to the detriment of the entire economic organism, has been superseded by a more economical use of materials and equipment. With trade between Russia and other countries rapidly increasing, this augurs well for the near future.

6. Nationalization was not only an outcome of the revolution but also a war emergency measure. It never included the small shops and the home industries. With return to peace conditions, more freedom is given to private initiative, and the small producer and cooperative producing societies are being encouraged. Said the chairman of the Highest Council of National Economy at the last economic convention: "There is no rule, custom, law or decree which should not be abolished, if as a result, we obtain more commodities, better commodities, an increased exchange with the villages, an improved economic system . . . If a factory could be operated under private management and it stands still under our control, it is a crime not to hand it over to a private owner when we are not in a position to run it. The main task is to overcome the crisis in goods as quickly as possible at whatever cost."

MOISSAYE J. OLGIN.

South

Spotted by Sun, and visible
Above me in a wave-green vault,
With that thick sticky linden-smell
Saturate, as the sea with salt.

Transmuting all the blue to green
And all the green to serpents' tongues,
Deep, ponderable, felt and seen,
And breathed in pain, with heavy lungs.

Is this that limber element
Which runs like light, and will not stop
To drink the apple's sap and scent
While thirsting for the mountain-top?

ELINOR WYLIE.

A COMMUNICATION

Pamphlets in Main Street

A Reply to Mr. Gleason

SIR: "Is the world out of adjustment?" The answer to that question depends upon the person questioned. Judge Gary says "Yes," for one reason; Organized Labor says "Yes," for another reason; the radical for another; and Mr. Gleason for still another reason. And Main Street? Main Street says, "No." And that is the essential characteristic of Main Street. And that, too, is the characteristic that Mr. Gleason fails to understand.

Mr. Gleason thinks that the home folks of Main Street are uneasily conscious that something is wrong, that they want a faith on which they can go forward. He sees the lines of social worry upon the cheery face of Sam Clark. Little Dave Dyer vaguely fears what the future holds for his country. No! nothing is wrong! Main Street wishes to go forward from a four-cylinder car to a six, and from a six to a twelve; from eight rabbits a day to a dozen, and from forty thousand dollars business a year to sixty thousand dollars. As for anything else, to attempt to move Main Street forward is the cardinal crime. Nothing is more treasured by it than the inertia underlying its mechanical progress. And for attempting to rob it of this inertia, Carol is hounded, Fern Mullins ruined, and Bjornstam crushed. Main Street is the home of the American "All-right-nik." Business fluctuates from "good" to "not so good," and their contentment varies with it. But it remains contentment. How, then, can a Home of Content have any "felt need?" Only through a rare and active sympathy with those who are less fortunate.

And has Main Street sympathy? Yes,—like a pack of hyenas all after the wounded animal. And it is upon this point that Carol's irreconcilable conflict is based. For Carol is one of those—fortunately—rare people of excellent intelligence, but of no specialized talent or ability, in whom an active, unsentimental sympathy is the very keynote of existence. Not being definitely gifted, she is at a handicap both in defence and attack; she has not the power, isolated as she is, to help those whose griefs she feels, and is consequently too often disgusted with herself, and forced into excessive introspection, appearing like a muddled child floundering hopelessly around among a group of grown-ups who all know what they want. Nevertheless she is a fine human being, and in no way is her worth shown so clearly as in Red Bjornstam's picking her as a natural comrade. For in both Carol and Bjornstam, the natural sympathetic impulse has never been betrayed by affectation, or pushed into the corner by excessive material interests.

What, then, of Dr. Kennicott, who operates on the injured farmer, administering ether by the light of a kerosene lamp? Mr. Gleason thinks that "when Dr. Kennicott feels good economics for his beloved town with as sharp a challenge as that which he answers here," Main Street will move. But *no*; it is not sympathy which moves Kennicott here, but a wholly different impulse,—the instinct of workmanship which he inherits from ages of physicians before him,—the same instinct that causes a master to stand by his ship, or a soldier to stick fast to a forlorn hope. Between his personal nonchalance over Bea and Olaf, and his professional sympathy, the contrast is most

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marked. But the physician's professional sympathy will not reach outside his profession, and personally Kennicott cares no more about the workers and farmers on whom Main Street lives, or for any of its other victims, than the rest of Gopher Prairie. If the advance of economics in Main Street is to wait on the extension of Dr. Kennicott's sympathies, it will wait.

Mr. Gleason believes that Main Street is to be conquered from within by the organization of small native groups. And who are to comprise these groups? Is the Jolly Seventeen to be commissioned en masse? Or does he see hope in the nervous activity of Vida Sherwin, riddled with complexes, with her venomous intolerance, her fast-held respectability, and her enthusiasm over molehills?

"Production for use" is of course one of the ideas for whose fulfillment the civilized elements in society are striving. And the idea of helping it along by the spreading of knowledge through pamphlets is an excellent one. But can Main Street be made to read the pamphlets? It is doubtful. Even if they were illustrated with Mutt and Jeff cartoons, it is doubtful. And having read them, can Main Street be prevented from saying, "Yes, but just the same, I don't see anything much the matter with things the way they are"?

Why not circulate the pamphlets among the mass of people who *do* see something wrong with things as they are—the workers? Arm *them* with knowledge. Flood *them* with information to counteract the lies of the press. For *they* are now the country's organs of change and life and progress. They are alive and moving now. But till Main Street is exploded or dragged by the neck it will not move. Till then the hope for progress is in the worker, and not in Sam Clark or Dr. Kennicott.

N. I. KISHOR.

New York City.

CORRESPONDENCE

Mexico and Prohibition

SIR: In your editoria in the New Republic of June 22nd on Mexico: Property First? I notice that you give Secretary Hughes credit for absolute integrity of purpose, even though he may be obsessed with an excessive preoccupation for the rights of property.

Now let us forget, for a moment, the theory that consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, and see what it might lead to.

If the owners of American corporations in Mexico can invoke the United States army and navy against the enactment of a confiscatory legal decree by the Mexican authorities, would it not be the proper thing to grant to Mexican citizens in the United States of America the same rights?

Let us assume that a citizen of Mexico located in the United States did lawfully own in 1912 property in beer, wine, liquors, fixtures and building. Let us assume that in 1920 the United States government proclaimed a legal decree which virtually confiscated the lawfully acquired property of this citizen of Mexico. If the position of Secretary Hughes is four-square and sincere, the Mexican citizen who had suffered confiscation would surely have the right to call on the military and naval power of the Mexican government in order to insure the exemption of his particular property from this decree, even though it did confiscate the property of many who were natives of, and citizens of the United States.

It is well known throughout the United States that the passage of the eighteenth amendment was really due to the power of the very men who now invoke this country's aid against the so-called confiscatory Mexican decree.

By what method of reasoning can such men presume to deny to the sovereign state of Mexico the power to enforce a decree far less confiscatory than the decree which they imposed so ruthlessly on eighty-five thousand property owners in the United States?

JOHN WALLASKELL.

Chicago, Illinois.

The Case System for Logic

SIR: Some pertinent observations are made by Professor Dickinson Miller in his article on The Great College Illusion which appeared in the New Republic for June 22nd. There is a vast difference, indeed, as he points out, between information and education, and far too much teaching is merely informative. It is on the basis of this differentiation that he speaks rather slightingly of the lecture method. Be it said, however, in defence of the lecture method that a good class-room lecture is not only informative but also interpretative. No amount of outside reading or of class-room exercises on the part of students can take the place of illuminating interpretation on the part of professors who have encompassed every angle of their subject. It is not a case of heaping information upon the student; it is a case of letting in the light.

However that may be, Professor Miller is on firm ground when he insists upon the training of judgment as essential to education, and also upon the use of the "case-system" in logic. What he has not discovered, apparently, is that the "case-system" is being used in courses in logic in the university with which he had been formerly connected. In Harvard University logic is now taught by the method of Langdell. Under the direction of Dr. H. M. Sheffer, who since the death of Josiah Royce has had charge of the courses in logic, formal text-books have been eliminated. In their place several brochures have been prepared for the special use of the classes. One of these is entitled Logic Cases For Philosophy C, 1919-20, and consists of excerpts from sources as widely different as Henry George's Progress and Poverty and J. Lubbock's Ants, Bees and Wasps, covering the entire fields of psychology, history, economics, sociology, biology and university administration. The aim of Dr. Sheffer is to do precisely what Professor Miller advises, namely, to train the judgment by the use of cases. The student is required to study the "case" and then to formulate his judgment as to the logical principles involved. In place of the principles being given in the text, they are derived from the text. It is nothing short of the experimental method in logic.

This method has been very successful at Harvard, and it would be a great service to teachers of logic in other universities if Dr. Sheffer would enlarge this brochure and publish it in book form. Then it would be clear to all that the "case-system" is just as adaptable to logic as to law and medicine.

Cambridge, Massachusetts. W. HENRY GEORGE.

The Cambridge History: A Protest

SIR: It is doubtless most ungracious on my part after Mr. Macy has singled me out for distinguished mention in his review of the Cambridge History of American Literature (New Republic, June 8th), to object to the character of that review. But an obstinate predilection for fairness may be pardoned in a philosopher. The Cambridge History is, so far as I know, the only attempt as yet made at an intellectual history of America. Surely the readers of the New Republic are entitled to have such a work judged by what it contains rather than be lightly dismissed because it does not follow the critic's taste as to the chronologic arrangement of the different articles. I do not wish to dispute Mr. Macy's right, if he has read the two volumes under review, to dismiss them as dull and stupid. I do not even care to object to the easy and rather cheap judgment that doctors of philosophy and professors of literature "lack philosophic insight and a vital sense of literature." But I do deny Mr. Macy's right to hold up the old-fashioned narrow identification of literature with belles lettres as decisive in this case. Those who conceive of literature as an expression of life have a perfect right to conceive of literature in a somewhat more generous fashion, and the readers of the New Republic have a right to have the results judged, favorably or unfavorably, from that point of view. Mr. Macy has obviously been too unsympathetic with the editor's whole effort to read the book with any care.

To prevent misunderstanding let me add that I am in hearty sympathy with the larger portion of Mr. Macy's review which is devoted to the expression of indignation at the suppression of Professor Riley's scholarly article on Christian Science.

New York City. MORRIS R. COHEN.

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Japan's Side of the Question

SIR: Japan as presented in the New Republic from time to time is not the Japan I know after eleven years' residence in that country. May I for the sake of a better understanding of a perplexing problem of today call attention to a few facts of history which seem forgotten by many writers?

Japan not desiring foreign interference in her politics, excluded foreigners from 1637, and lived her own life with almost no contact with other nations. From this seclusion she was driven by the demands of the United States when Admiral Perry, in 1853, visited Japan with warships.

Compelled to associate with "civilized" nations, Japan's leaders took pains to learn their ways and to adapt the things of the West to the needs of their people. Since that early distinguished embassy—Iwakura, Okubo, Kido, and others—was sent to investigate in 1871, there have always been picked men and women abroad studying along many lines, who return to work out in Japan what they think will be of use to their country. Always there is a difference of opinion in Japan as to the value of some of these "foreign" notions—as is pleasantly told in a letter of a Japanese woman not written for publication, but appearing in the June Atlantic.

What keen, far-seeing leaders have accepted as valuable, they have had the ability to adapt and use in Japan. There are schools, and education is compulsory. If there are not democratic forms of government the people are being fitted to take part in government instead of being given responsibility without preparation to meet it. The ability to read in Japan today is about 90 per cent, in India 6 per cent, in China less than 5 per cent. There are men versed in the best medical knowledge of the West, and certain sanitary measures are compulsory. House-cleaning is supervised. If the germs of plague can be vanquished only by fire, a house is burned, but the disease is conquered. These measures may seem severe and sound too much like "es ist verboten" . . . but why should not ignorance and disease be forbidden by an intelligent and capable people? Some will still remember the enviable record of the medical staff during the Russo-Japanese War, when the number of deaths from preventable causes was reduced to a minimum not previously attained. There are military men in Japan and military service is compulsory. We may well question the value of what Japan has learned from the West in this department, but she has learned.

She cannot help seeing that the people of a little island group on the west of Eurasia as her islands are on the east, did not stay within their small domain, but are in possession of wide areas "on which the sun never sets," and she has seen the nations of the West, coming closer and closer to her gates. May we not ask, "If we were protectors of a country so circumscribed, so threatened by powerful peoples, what would *we* do?"

At the close of the China-Japan War* (1895), Port Arthur, that prize sought by Russia, was Japan's—but for a short time only. France, Germany and Russia compelled Japan to give it up and shortly the Russians possessed it. To quote from Wells' Outline—"In 1898 Germany descended upon China—annexed a portion of the province of Shantung. Thereupon Russia seized the Liaotung peninsula, and extorted the consent of China to an extension of her trans-Siberian railway to Port Arthur: and in 1900 she occupied Manchuria. Britain was unable to resist the imitative impulse, and seized the port of Wei-hai-wei, 1898. How alarming these movements must have been to every intelligent Japanese, a glance at the map will show." [Vol. II, page 469.]

The "partition of China" among European Powers was at that time commonly talked about and fully expected. Russia was on the Yalu, that narrow river that separates Korea from Manchuria. How independent Korea was can easily be learned by reading of her relations with China and Russia during a period of years. With her neighbors permitting these aggressions of western Powers, could Japan sit idly down and do nothing to prevent their advance? She did not. She fought the Russo-Japan War and for a time checked the western Powers. Those who heard from participants of the bloody struggle at 203 Meter Hill know at what cost Japan regained Port Arthur, taken from her and given to Russia at the close of the China-Japan War.

We do not condone in the least the methods of the Japanese government in Korea and in China and we know that many Japanese deplore the measures taken. But when we look at the frightful details, the work of some Japanese, let us not forget other frightful details, the work of some of our own people in Haiti and even in our own states. Let us not forget Japan's difficult position—her independence threatened, as is plainly shown by a review of history, by the strength of western Powers and the weakness of her neighbors. If we look only at one side we cannot see the whole truth, we have not a basis for fair judgment, we are promoting misunderstanding and hatreds that lead to war when the world needs understanding, good will and peace.

AMY GIFFORD LEWIS.

New York City.

*For the cause of this war see What Shall I Think of Japan? by Arthur Gleason, page 49. (Macmillan).

"Tom, I Like your Tinkles"

SIR: In reading up the back numbers of the New Republic, that have accumulated during my absence of six months, I find on page 175 of the issue for January 5th, Constance Mayfield Rourke's review of Crowding Memories, by Mrs. Thomas Bailey Aldrich. When I came to the line, "He brands Whitman's manner as a hollow affectation," I recalled an incident related in an interesting article published some years ago, in the Bookman I think, giving an account of the uptown migration of the forgatherings of literary Bohemia in New York of the sixties to nineties. Mention was made of one resort famous for its good beer and the generous hospitality of its proprietor to aspiring genius, where a specially reserved chair was usually occupied by Whitman as titular Gamaliel. About the time a small collection of the poems of Thomas Bailey Aldrich was being published. Aldrich strayed into the resort and was being congratulated by some of his friends in the group present, when Whitman in his large and expansive manner said, "Yes, Tom, I like your tinkles," for which pleasantry, the article went on to say, Aldrich never quite forgave Whitman.

These appreciations, each of the other, were done in half a dozen words.

"Yes, Tom, I like your tinkles."

"Whitman's manner was a hollow affectation."

And both of them are pat, and that's another half a dozen words.

OTIS A. POOLE.

Shidzuoka, Japan.

Bessarabia Returns to Rumania

SIR: In the issue of the New Republic of June 8th, commenting on a letter of Mr. P. Trubetzkoy, you write:

"As a fact, Rumania took advantage of the weakness of Rússia, to seize Bessarabia, which she still holds by force of arms."

Bessarabia has never been an independent province. It has never been an independent political unit. It has always been a part of that greater ethnical unit known as Moldavia without having a separate name. This name of Bessarabia is an artificial one. It was invented by Russia after 1812. Its inhabitants call themselves not "Bessarabians" but Moldavians.

Russia took this part of Moldavia from Rumania partly in 1812, and partly in 1878 after the war with Turkey, which war was won by Russia only through Rumanian assistance. It was the Rumanian army which saved the Russians at the doors of Plevna. Rumania vainly protested against this treacherous act of force.

This return of Bessarabia to Rumania was decreed by the population of their own free will. Soon after the first Russian revolution the Soldiers' Congress of Bessarabia proclaimed (October 21, 1917) the political and territorial autonomy of Bessarabia; on December 2, 1917, the National Assembly proclaimed the Federative Republic; on January 27, 1918, the same Assembly proclaimed the independence of the "Moldavian Republic" and on March 27, 1918, the return of Bessarabia to the mother-country.

If there is today a non-Rumanian population in Bessarabia (at most one of thirty per cent according to official Russian statistics) it is due only to the Russian policy of colonization inaugurated in 1814. Many thousands of Rumanian peasants were compelled at that time to leave their homes in Bessarabia, and to settle in the far East. In their place have been called Bulgarian, German and Russo-Ukrainian settlers—to accomplish the vainly attempted Russification of Rumania.

J. SCHIOPUL.

Cleveland, Ohio.

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Books and Things

THERE is usually a core of justice in abuse that is whole-hearted, so I suppose many teachers of English composition in our colleges do deserve the reproaches that are piled upon nearly all. But it is a chorus that I shall never join. Looking backward in the general direction of Harvard, as Harvard was in the late eighteen-eighties, I think of the men who were teaching English composition there with pleasure and gratitude. To Adams Sherman Hill and Barrett Wendell and Dean Briggs my contemporaries are indebted for benefits never forgotten, although not easy to describe. These three men gave us, one of them is still giving our successors, rules that were helpful, and incidental words of advice and encouragement more helpful than even the soundest rules. None of us has learned to write so as to please these high judges, for they were not easily pleased, yet had it not been for their teaching what we have written would have been even less to their liking.

In journalism one hasn't time, while writing any one article, to profit consciously by good advice. In journalism we all come near to satisfying Bishop Blougram's idea of a journalist, "the rough and ready man who writes apace, reads somewhat seldomer, thinks perhaps even less." It would be pleasant, I am sure, to think before beginning to write, but for such a luxury one seldom has time. My own method of filling this particular page is to potter about, day after day, hunting for a subject, finding none until the last minute, and then pitching upon something which isn't satisfactory, which will have to serve, and out of which one could have made a better article if one hadn't waited so long. Once a subject is found the rest is much easier, too easy. In many cases the article almost writes itself. Rewriting cuts it down to within a few lines of the prescribed length, and so the manuscript goes to the printer, for better or worse. Sometimes, when I look over an article that is several months old, and that I had almost forgotten, I am compelled to wonder what subject I thought I had in my head at the time of writing. Of subject, a trace. Such is the verdict of a fresh eye.

Today, perhaps because I am in the city heat for a week or so, my problem has suddenly turned itself inside out. Subjects abound, but not more than two or three sentences can I write about any of them. All subjects, as soon as I lay hands upon them, look alike. Each proves to be nothing but the starting-point for an article that I have already written and published several hundred times. Here, for example, is something that looks new enough, The Tower of Babel. What could such a day have been like? In the early morning everybody understood everybody else as well as usual. By noon communication was growing difficult. At nightfall every man was searching for somebody who could still speak his dialect and understood it when spoken. One ought to be able to do an article of this sort without much trouble—everybody speaking English, say, to begin with; then foreign words intruding themselves into the dialogue, as single spies at first, later in battalions; until at nightfall each man's speech had changed into the separate purity of French, Italian, German or Russian. An easy subject? Nothing easier. All that is needed is a little ingenuity and the counsel of a few linguistic friends.

Having been deprived of the New Statesman for several weeks, on getting to town I hunted it up, and in the issue of June 4th I came immediately upon a good subject. Mr. Robert Lynd says, in his review of Mr. Wells's new book: "The question remains whether the ordinary man can ever be brought to think of the world as a thing worth living and dying for as he has often thought his country worth living and dying for. If the world were attacked by the inhabitants of another planet, world-patriotism would become a necessity of self-defense, and the peoples of the world would be presented with the alternative of uniting or perishing." What a good point of departure! The article would begin in mystery, with reports of strange happenings, of signs and tokens which, inexplicable at first, came little by little to be understandable upon no hypothesis except that of the beginnings of an invasion from another planet. Then the invaders would arrive in force, would do monstrous things, would eat our gold perhaps, and cause our rivers to plunge underground and be lost. Before long we should all be brothers. Articles in praise of the Boches would appear in the Echo de Paris, the New York Times would urge unity of command under a Bolshevist general. Such an article might end in the conquest of this world and the extermination of its inhabitants. It might end in the repulse of the invaders, and in quarrels among the victors.

The most attractive of the subjects to choose from was suggested by one of the famous passages in William James's Psychology, in the Chapter on Attention: *"My experience is what I agree to attend to.* Only those items which I *notice* shape my mind—without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent and emphasis, light and shade, background and foreground—intelligible perspective, in a word. It varies in every creature, but without it the consciousness of every creature would be a gray chaotic indiscriminateness, impossible for us even to conceive. Such an empiricist writer as Mr. Spencer, for example, regards the creature as absolutely passive clay, upon which experience rains down. The clay will be impressed most deeply where the drops fall thickest, and so the final shape of the mind is moulded. Give time enough, and all sentient things ought, at this rate, to end by assuming an identical mental constitution—for 'experience,' the sole shaper, is a constant fact, and the order of its items must end by being exactly reflected by the passive mirror which we call the sentient organism. If such an account were true, a race of dogs bred for generations, say in the Vatican, with characters of visual shape, sculptured in marble, presented to their eyes, in every variety of form and combination, ought to discriminate before long the finest shades of these peculiar characters. In other words, they ought to become, if time were given, accomplished *connoisseurs* of sculpture. Any one may judge of the probability of this consummation. Surely an eternity of experience of the statues would leave the dog as inartistic as he was at first, for the lack of an original interest to knit his discriminations on to. Meanwhile the odors at the bases of the pedestals would have organized themselves in the consciousness of this breed of dogs into a system of 'correspondences' to which the most hereditary caste of *custodi* would never approximate, merely because to them, as human beings, the dog's interest in those smells would for ever be an inscrutable mystery."

Subject and title are not often thus handed to one, on the same platter, by the same hand. Dogs in the Vatican is a subject with many obvious yet illuminating applications, some of which I could make, no doubt, were I not myself a dog in the Vatican, blind and deaf to the shades and tones differentiating the things which constitute our audible, visible, thinkable world, and condemned by habit to go through the motions of sniffing at the bases of many pedestals, although deprived—I hope only temporarily—of the sense of smell.

P. L.

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Bryce on Democracies

Modern Democracies, by James Bryce (Viscount Bryce). New York: The Macmillan Co.

THIS voluminous work is a stock-taking of democratic institutions by one than whom there is no one better able to make a thorough inventory. It is a subject that has been the study of his long life, with exceptionally good opportunities for examining it both inside and out. His knowledge is broad and deep both as to theory and practice. The result is a work whose magnitude and quality make it the splendid crown of an illustrious career as scholar, statesman and political philosopher.

It appears at a time when democratic institutions are spreading fast. Lord Bryce points out that since 1918 seven new states have sprung up in Europe and three in western Asia, all with democratic institutions. In addition, Hungary, Poland and China, which have yet to settle their form of government, are at least leaning towards democracy. Even without counting these three, the number of democracies in the world has doubled within fifteen years.

Is this a solid and permanent development or is it a transient phase? It is pointed out that after the rule of the people came to an end in the ancient world, there was not for over a thousand years any serious attempt to restore democratic institutions. The beginnings of popular government in the modern world are not traceable farther back than the rise of the Italian republics of the eleventh century. Their experience was not such as to establish democracy where it appeared and their example did not tend to propagate it elsewhere. "Democracy is a new thing in the modern world," Lord Bryce justly observes. It may be added that so recent is its ascendency as a state of sentiment in our own country that it has not been many years, as history runs, since its name ceased to be a term of opprobrium. The framers of our Constitution were certainly not democrats. Contrary to most popular notions on the subject, the statesman of our formative period who leaned farthest towards democracy, was Hamilton. He recommended a scheme of government very much like that which actually exists in Canada today. His scheme of centring control in a House of Representatives elected by manhood suffrage, with appointment of state executives by the federal government, as is still the practice in Canada and other English commonwealths, shocked the Virginia conservatives, intent upon checks and balances for the protection of their class interests. Jefferson, luckily for his political career, was out of the country at the time, and hence he could avoid making an open record of his views, but his private correspondence shows that the claim that he acted upon democratic principles is a piece of political mythology. Madison took pains to explain to the closely limited electorate of that day, that the new federal constitution proposed for their adoption would not introduce democracy. "Democracies," he observed, "have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention, have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property, and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."

Has the time really come when this verdict should be reversed? That is a matter which Lord Bryce investigates minutely. He examines in detail the workings of democratic institutions in the republics of antiquity, the republics of Spanish America, France, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. In the light of that survey, he then enters upon an elaborate examination and criticism of democratic institutions in general. The survey is replete with valuable information upon the practical operation and actual attainments of the governmental systems considered, and this feature of his work is of itself sufficient to make it indispensable to historians and publicists.

The eight chapters, aggregating one hundred and sixty-five pages, that he devotes to the United States, form a particularly interesting section. It does not repeat the description he gave of our institutions in The American Commonwealth, but is a new and independent study. Although it comes thirty years later, it does not show that he has had any occasion to alter the conclusions he reached in 1888. There is plenty to show that he has a tender regard for the American people; but much more to show that political conditions in the United States are a sad disappointment to democratic hopes. And when he is dealing with other countries he frequently makes comparisons to the disadvantage of the United States. In considering the case of the South American republics he speaks of it as a misfortune that they took the Constitution of the United States as their model, so unsuitable was it for their circumstances. Elsewhere he remarks that the new European republics would do well to look to Switzerland as "a model fit to be studied by other free governments."

Most in Switzerland and least in the United States, he finds what gives him a cheerful view of democratic prospects, concerning which in general he is plainly dubious although hopeful. It is therefore a most interesting circumstance that these two republics, although the one figures as a good model and the other rather as a dreadful example, closely resemble one another in their general framework of government. Yet along with this similarity of constitution goes the greatest difference in behavior. To what is this due? The answer directs attention to the fundamental principle of government,—the controlling influence of conditions. As Lord Bryce observes: "The conditions do much to make the men, and the men learn how to use the conditions; the institutions are the work of the men, and become in turn influences molding the characters of those who work them."

Considered merely as an abstract statement the profound importance of this principle will scarcely be appreciated. The point may be made clearer by a concrete example drawn from ordinary business experience. An employer is aware of leakage from his cash receipts and doesn't know how to stop it. One tells him that his trouble is due to the fact that he is not careful enough about putting honest men in office. Another suggests a system of examinations by which he will exclude the unfit. Another advises effort to inculcate morality. These are all meritorious suggestions, but the problem is not efficaciously attacked until the question is asked, what sort of a system have you for keeping your cash? It appears that each counter has its till from which the men behind take what money they require in doing business. The proper remedy is a change of system. Abolish the tills, put the custody of the money in the hands of a cashier and verify his accounts at frequent intervals. The change of system will not absolutely preclude individual delinquency but will promptly expose it, and it will establish conditions that will tend to secure financial integrity and give tone and character to the service. Just this and no more is meant by a sound budget system in the management of the public business, and the possession or the lack of it may make all

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the difference between success or failure in democratic government.

More distinctly than in any other country the case of Switzerland illustrates the efficacy of sound conditions. The present reputation of Switzerland for honest and economical government is of very recent date. The referendum is an institution that has descended from mediaeval times, but possession of it did not prevent Swiss politics from being long notorious for corruption. Schiller expressed the common opinion of his times when in his famous drama The Robbers, he made one of his characters refer to Switzerland as "an Athens of scoundrels." In the forties when Lord Brougham was writing his Political Philosophy, Switzerland still figured as a country in which venality and intrigue were the chief political characteristics. The present reputation of Switzerland does not date farther back than the last third of the nineteenth century. It is attributable to the changes in the system of government made by the constitution of 1848, which was modelled on the Constitution of the United States, with these important differences:

The Federal Council, which is the analogue of our President and his Cabinet, is elected by the Congress, which was the original plan of our own Constitution but was defeated by the opposition of the small states, to appease which the cumbrous machinery of the electoral college was invented. Hence the nominating convention which is an American peculiarity. Hence the peculiarly massive development of party organization, the need for enormous campaign funds, the conversion of the public offices into party barracks. Occasion for all this extra-constitutional party machinery is avoided by the Swiss system. We are pleased to describe our system as election by the people, although everyone knows that the people must put up with what the convention selects for them. Why should not Congress rather than an irresponsible convention be trusted to make the selection? Hard things have been said of our Congress but it has never rated quite so low in character as a nominating convention. The humbug that convention action facilitates popular choice does not go down with the Swiss people. In 1900 an initiative proposing the election of the Federal Council by the people was crushingly defeated at the polls.

The Swiss executive heads have facilities of access to the Congress such as were intended for our heads of departments by the framers of our Constitution, but which were defeated by anti-Federalist strategy at the first session of Congress when the government was set up. Warned by the consequences, the Swiss constitution-makers carefully guarded that point. The Swiss constitution expressly confers upon the Federal Council the right to introduce bills in Congress, participate in debate and propose amendments. The practical result has been that the whole business of preparing measures for consideration devolves on the Federal Council. They function in conjunction with the Congress exactly like the heads of a business corporation meeting with the Board of Directors, and the analogy is completed by the fact that in recent years it has become the practice of the Swiss Congress to meet quarterly, the session not lasting over three weeks. The system obviates committee hold-ups, filibustering, log-rolling and buncombe, and it has salutary reactions through the whole governmental system and party procedure as well.

Now suppose constitutional government in the United States should break down through corruption and incapacity, would that imply an inherent defect in democracy, or would it not rather be due to neglect or inability to provide appropriate conditions for democratic government? Where it is properly organized, democracy is the most able and efficient form of government, for all the energy, knowledge, talents, attainments and resources of the people are actively at its service. The principles of constitutional government are now sufficiently well understood and applied to avert such general defeat as democratic systems of government have experienced in the past. Somewhere the standard will be upheld even in the worst of times. It is not improbable that some of the existing democracies may illustrate Talleyrand's cynical definition of a democracy as an aristocracy of blackguards, but the permanence of democracy as a settled form of government is really better assured than that of any other type. Democracy certainly won the war; it now stands a better chance of winning peace than any other system of government.

HENRY JONES FORD.

"The Next War"

"The Next War," by Will Irwin. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.

NO matter how people's minds have been upset by the Peace of Versailles, a tremendous amount of unorganized sentiment exists against the repetition of war. Most clergymen, even those who were anti-German, are fundamentally against war. Most intellectuals are against it. Bankers, as Mr. Will Irwin says, are for peace, even if they make for war. The average worker, man or woman, is against war. The average tax-payer is against it. The farmer is against it. But in spite of a great anti-war sentiment hardly a day goes by without some talk of "the next war." The British "sphere of influence" (that is to say, of trade exclusiveness) in part of China; the American interests in Mexico; the interests of Germany as against France; the interests of Japan in China—all these are regarded as problems of power so provocative and explosive that they make war not merely thinkable but unavoidable. So we have a public at once pacific and fatalistic, desiring peace and seeing war as necessary, subscribing to the ideal of world organization and yet pushing forward on the path to destruction.

This is a useless confusion. Either people ought to admit that pacifism is futility or they ought to give a real meaning to the program of peace. To believe that there is some fatal flaw in the dream of world-peace simply because the last war could not be met by eleventh-hour pacifism is to abandon this world to anarchy. Eleventh-hour pacifism did not work in 1917, and no pacifist has shown how it could have worked. But if war is produced by conditions that are themselves controllable, which it is, our task is to understand those conditions in time, to pay the price that controlling them entails, and to control them. That is real pacifism, reasonable pacifism. To underwrite the conditions that produce war and yet to resist war itself is a form of sentimentality that does the cause of pacifism no service. It makes the soul sick.

"The Next War" is a pamphlet written in the name of common sense. It is one of the most massive and well-ordered arguments that has ever been made against the institution of war. It is plain, clear, even-tempered and sober. To read it is a duty because in compact form it organizes a case against war on a plane that people can appreciate. It gives a form to sentiment in which senti-

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ment can become properly effective. After reading it one can reasonably say that the task of Harding, his Cabinet, and the American people for the next four years is set out in unmistakable terms; and unless those terms are accepted we are destined to have either a disillusionment with our present statecraft like nothing we have previously experienced or else to eat the bitter fruit of its corrupt seed.

Mr. Irwin does not hesitate to dwell on the probabilities of "the next war." He doesn't try to name the combatants. He is content to imagine the implements, and to suggest their consequences. He declares, too conservatively, that "there will be no great improvements in guns and high-explosive projectiles." But he has no such feeling about the possibilities of gas-bombs, germ-bombs, the killing of women, submarine and aeroplane warfare. He shows, quite convincingly, that first-rate civilian intelligence has at last been mobilized by the general staffs, that the problem of destruction has at last been faced imaginatively and fearlessly, and that the sciences have been effectively conscripted. One man like Soddy may decline to help out the military state, but there are practically no laboratories in the civilized world that are not at the service of their army and navy departments, and since the armistice in 1918 research has delivered incredibly greater facilities for destruction to every modern government. "At the time of the Armistice, we were manufacturing for the campaign of 1919 our Lewisite gas. It was invisible; it was a sinking gas, which would search out the refugees of dugouts and cellars; if breathed, it killed at once—and it killed not only through the lungs. Wherever it settled on the skin, it produced a poison which penetrated the system and brought almost certain death. It was inimical to all cell-life, animal or vegetable. Masks alone were of no use against it. Further, it had *fifty-five times* the 'spread' of any poison gas hitherto used in the war. An expert has said that a dozen Lewisite air bombs of the greatest size in use during 1918 might with a favorable wind have eliminated the population of Berlin. Possibly he exaggerated, but probably not greatly. . . . Now we have more than a hint of a gas beyond Lewisite. . . ."

Given such facilities, what will "the next war" be like? To help our imaginations Mr. Irwin sums up the effects of the last war—ten million combatants dead, thirty million non-combatants, the destruction of potent youth in most cases, the destruction in northern France to the full extent of a Greater New York, the national debt amounting in the case of France to forty-six billions—"almost exactly half her total wealth"; in the case of Britain to forty billions as against one hundred and twenty in total wealth; the war-bill and armament bill now amounting in the United States to 93 per cent of federal expenditures. By using simple charts and clear figures Mr. Irwin brings home the appalling facts as to the last war. It is not even in his power to make us realize the repetition of this lunacy.

What then? Mr. Irwin examines all the national "service" talk, the manliness of war, the tonic of war, national honor, the necessity for defence and offensive-defence. He rounds up with the assertion that "two great tasks lie before humanity in the rest of the twentieth century. One is to put under control of true morals and of democracy the great power of human production which came in the ninteenth century. The other is to check, to limit and finally to eliminate the institution of war. This last is the more important."

How can it be done? Mr. Irwin believes in a real citizenship of nations in which nations no more than individuals are allowed to pack a gun; he believes in the end of nation's saying "my country, right or wrong." "Call your organization a League of Nations, an association of nations, a Hague Tribunal 'with teeth in it'—call it what you will, organize it how you will. This is the specific for the disease of war." He believes in disarmament, in the uprooting of "financial imperialism," in the abolition of secret diplomacy. "Some internationalization of export capital seems necessary to permanent peace." "We need the law; we need also personal ethics—international morality. . . . This does not mean abolishing the sentiment of patriotism. There are two conceptions of that noble old emotion."

These proposed ways to peace are not new. Neither is Mr. Irwin's perception of the truths that Norman Angell and David Starr Jordan have framed before him. He pays his tribute to Angell and Jordan, and he makes no claim as to novelty. But his book is immensely valuable just because it is the expression of a war-correspondent who has no particular formula to apply. It comes, as it should, with personal impact, with the sense of one man's unswerving conviction, of his urgency and human faith. It proves by its figures and charts and photographs that war is hellish: but its real message is its conviction that we ourselves in America can show the way out. It is in our power, working through the malleable Harding and Hughes and Hoover and the shrewd Will Hays, to make this program of a new start effective all along the line. England, France and our other debtors cannot possibly pay us, but they can as our debtors be induced to agree with us on the terms of our fresh start. That is the conviction that this magnificent book revives in us, with its hard common sense, with its clean obedience to unalterable idealism.

FRANCIS HACKETT.

A Throwback in Fiction

The Wreck, by Rabindranath Tagore. New York: The Macmillan Co.

MR. TAGORE'S novels are primarily written for his Indian audience, but like his poetry and drama they show the technical influence of western art. Nevertheless, to compare them with western fiction is neither profitable nor fair. The novel is the characteristic literary form of the Occident, the form which has come to fit most closely the substance of our civilization. Through it, human beings in their relations, social background and significance can be reproduced most truly, and the human scene given its most life-like representation. But the novel became adapted to this service in the West through long evolution, and the germ of fiction which developed into the western novel had its origin in the Orient. It is not fanciful to say that Mr. Tagore's novels carry us part of the way back along the track of this evolution. In their primitive, unsophisticated, naive quality they resemble certain transitional modes of fiction in that past when oriental story was being shaped to western uses.

Most of Mr. Tagore's novels are what we used to call tendency fiction, his situations selected with a view to illuminating certain social problems of India and the bearing of his own philosophy upon them. Gorah, considered the most important, deals in the person of a Eurasian hero with the conflict between the new national feeling and the old caste system of India. It is to be hoped that it

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will soon be translated and take its place among those intensive studies of personality which have been the great achievement of the twentieth century in fiction—Jean Christophe, Pelle, Christian Wahnschaffer. In The Home and the World Mr. Tagore has undertaken to give a sketch of young intellectuals occupied with the problem of preserving the social framework in an India disturbed by western competitive civilization and shaken by the ideal of Swaraj. It reminds us of the picture of the revolution in Smoke and other novels of Turgeniev. In The Wreck Mr. Tagore has no announced purpose; he calls the novel a Hindu Romance; but one cannot doubt that in the gentleness, the serenity, the simplicity, the moral elevation of his characters he is enforcing what he sees as the eternal difference between East and West.

The Wreck shows its primitive quality in the predominance of the story. Ramesh, a law student in Calcutta, in love with Hemnalini, is summoned home by his father to marry. He dares not resist, but takes so little interest in the matter that he does not even look at his bride. As the wedding party is returning from the bride's home in boats a storm sweeps over the Padma, the boats are overwhelmed, and Ramesh is cast up by the waves on a sandy island. The only other survivor is a girl in the crimson dress of a bride whom Ramesh takes to be his own. Some time later he finds out the truth that there was another wedding party on the stream, and that Kamala was the bride of a man whom she had never seen, whose name she had never heard, and whom she naturally supposed to be Ramesh. Ramesh without undeceiving her sends Kamala away to school, and revives his old friendship with Hemnalini, to whom he becomes engaged. But Kamala returns to Ramesh for the holidays, and in his perplexity between his responsibility to her and his engagement to Hemnalini he finds himself utterly passive—and in his compromising situation, an easy prey to his rival for Hemnalini's favor. He flees from Calcutta and voyages with Kamala up the Ganges, intending to settle in some small town and practice as a pleader. Kamala, however, is made suspicious by the uncertainty of Ramesh's behavior, and learning the true situation from a letter which he had written to Hemnalini and characteristically failed to send, she runs away, and finally becomes a servant in the household of Nalinaksha, whose mother is seeking to marry him to Hemnalini. It is needless to say that Nalinaksha is the husband from whom Kamala was separated by the storm which gave her to Ramesh.

The story in its symmetrical series of complications, in its reliance on the devices of mistaken identity and recognition, in the idealism of the characters recalls vividly those Greek romances which represent the transition of fiction from the East to the West in the early centuries of the Christian era. In its realistic detail, however, The Wreck reminds one of a Russian novel; on the steamer to Benares, with Kamala setting up her kitchen on deck, we might be with Gorki on the Volga. Human nature, as in primitive stories, is extraordinarily simple; the problem in the story is moral, not psychological, and the characters remain quite uncomplicated by it. They are as pellucid as spring water and we see down to their very depths. Hemnalini, Nalinaksha, Kamala, are strong, noble in their renunciation. Uncle Chakrabartti, who is the god out of the machine, is utterly benevolent. Ramesh, the hero, is weak, but the author is not in the least ashamed of him. His complete good will is sufficient heroism, and his failure in action, which in a hero of western fiction would be an affront, rather serves to establish the poetic justice of his marriage to Hemnalini. All the characters are idealists. The situation is never influenced by physical passion. Even Ramesh's rival, Akshay, is a perfectly pure villain. Although he is fully conscious of Hemnalini's rejection and knows that there is nothing in it all for him, he pursues Ramesh about the country—and it is to his obsession that Hemnalini shall marry someone besides Ramesh that we owe the introduction of Nalinaksha. But with this simplification of humanity we get an extraordinary effect of beauty of human attitudes and relations, the truth of human emotion. In the static, passive mode of their association the characters show the essential quality of eastern fiction.

ROBERT MORSS LOVETT.

The Old Man's Youth

The Old Man's Youth, by William De Morgan. New York: Henry Holt & Co.

LOVERS of De Morgan will be glad to find in this final effort the discerning amplitude of the novelist's earlier work. The story of The Old Man's Youth, written as the recollections of a lonely waif in a work house infirmary has effective continuity of design and an arresting illumination which is both vital and delicate. The novel was incomplete at the author's death, but the unobtrusive setting by Mrs. De Morgan links the disjointed chapters and rounds out the narrative.

The employment of Eustace John's point of view gives an engaging intimacy and at the same time provides for that leisurely development whereby the best De Morgan characters live and breath before the reader. Tinged with ineffable sadness, the story possesses also a high and simple courage, somewhat as the ruthlessness of observation is balanced by a very human warmth. The too casual reader may be fretted at the slow movement, but it is by this very fullness of conception that the author achieves much of his sense of verity. There is not much detached, sensuous description, but characters and scenes are vividly objectified through action and comment. Eustace John's family and friends, his misdirected art studies and his youthful loves and wonderments are set forth with a richness of significance which is never forced. If the book, as the publishers announce, is largely autobiographical, it reveals a brave and sensitive spirit capable of the self-analysis which becomes impersonal through the author's own breadth of perception.

R. H.

Contributors

ANDREW FURUSETH is president of the International Seamen's Union of America. He was instrumental in bringing about the passage of the Seamen's act, and is an authority on the American merchant marine.

ANNE MARTIN was former chairman of the National Woman's party and Independent candidate for United States Senator from Nevada in 1918 and 1920.

JOHN DEWEY, professor of philosophy at Columbia, is at present in China.

PADRAIC COLUM, the Irish poet and dramatist, is the author of Asgard and the Sword of the Volsungs, and The Girl Who Sat by the Ashes.

MOISSAYE J. OLGIN, a Russian writer who came to America a few years ago, has recently returned from a six months' visit to Russia. He is the author of The Soul of the Russian Revolution and A Guide to Russian Literature (1820-1917).

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

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

From the book, Fragments of a Life, by A. Zimmerman

My sadness 's not the sadness deep of a poet,
A homeless sufferer my sorrow tell you could,
And a little bird deprived of freedom and of light
As I can often brood;
And often at night in a desert cold and wild,
As I, a wolf cries in woe and pain and deep fear,
Though he knows that helped would not be by the Lord far,
And pitied 's n't by men near.

* * *

There are thoughts that 're born only in the mind
Of the poor, homeless, shelterless one,
In the minds of those that 're alone,
O, many of them were born in my mind.
There are thoughts that 're born only in the mind
Of the one that 's out in rain and storm,
Anl feels as on a rock, a worm.
O, many of them were born in my mind.
There are thoughts that 're born only in a mind
That can not see a world in need
And wants for others cry and plead.
O, many of them were born in my mind.

—Adv. A. ZIMMERMAN.

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